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ABSTRACT
Jeffersonianism and 19th Century American Maritime Defense
Policy
By
Christopher T. Ziegler

This paper analyzes the fundamental maritime defense
mentality that permeated America throughout the early part
of the Republic. For fear of economic debt and foreign wars,
Thomas Jefferson and his Republican party opposed the
construction of a formidable blue water naval force.
Instead, they argued for a small naval force capable of
engaging the Barbary pirates and other small similar forces.
For protection of the nation and commerce, they wanted a
strictly defensive strategy developed around coastal
gunboats and harbor fortifications. This research will
analyze the naval aspect of this defense mentality from its
creation in 1794 through the War of 1812. The coastal
defense analysis will begin at the same time and conclude
with the end of the American Civil War.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Modern military thinkers have long criticized the
defensive stance the early American Republic adopted against
European hostilities. The purpose of this research is to
investigate and analyze the failure of the American
strategic maritime policy during the early years of the
republic. Maritime defense has many accepted principles,
most of which were neglected for various reasons during this
time. As a result, America was ill equipped for war
throughout much of the nineteenth century. The lack of an
effective naval force yet presence of a strong, thriving,
and vital commercial maritime trade set the stage for a
great deal of international tension and unique political
ideologies.
To a certain degree this lack of preparedness is
explained by the financial weakness and small population of
the fledgling nation. As significant as the limited
resources, were the beliefs and political rhetoric of Thomas
Jefferson. Jefferson’s policies contained two distinctive
flaws. First, he believed a large naval contingent was not
beneficial because of the friction its existence would incur
from European powers. He feared this friction would only
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help in establishing a reason for Europe to expand its
belligerency into American matters. Jefferson’s strict
reliance upon a primarily defensive maritime military
posture ultimately failed in preventing war with Europe. His
second miscalculation was his theory that America’s
commercial power could provide an effective influence over
warring nations. Jefferson argued that if the U.S. could not
afford to protect the commercial fleets, then they should be
recalled to American ports in time of war. Nations requiring
American goods would have to come to the U.S. and accept the
responsibility of transport aboard their own vessels. This
strategic use of commercial control also proved ineffective.
We will analyze this information in four chapters. The
first chapter will deal with Thomas Jefferson and his
political and ideological thoughts. This will include
biographical information about Jefferson and the education
that would form this revolutionary’s mind. His ideology will
be scrutinized to explain how it influenced American defense
policy and its specific application to the United States
Navy and coastal defense construction programs. The second
chapter will explain accepted strategic naval and maritime
policy, illustrating flaws in Jefferson’s perceptions of
defense and war. Chapter three will discuss naval
development during Jefferson’s presidency. A brief
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examination of the origins of the navy under the Federalist
administration will be provided for the sake of comparison.
This period of study will end with the conclusion of the War
of 1812. The fourth chapter centers upon the numerous
construction programs involving fortifications and coastal
defense along the American seaboard. Under Jeffersonian
policy these purely defensive measures were the ideal system
for the fledgling nation. Combining defense with low
maintenance cost, they could be manned by small inexpensive
garrisons. In time of war Jefferson’s coveted militia could
man them. They would serve as the most significant arm in
Jefferson’s strictly defensive policy when coupled with the
small gunboat fleets. This study will begin in 1794 and
conclude with the American Civil War.
It is hoped that by the end of this work the reader
will have an understanding of the various elements that
influenced the early American political, commercial, and
military experience. Hopefully, a clear distinction will be
made between the pragmatic limitations and ideological
principles that shaped the early American defense policy.
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CHAPTER 2
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ENLIGHTENED DEFENSE

Thomas Jefferson was born on April 13, 1743, in what is
now Albemarle County, Virginia.1 Except for occasions when he
was away on state business, he spent his entire life on the
plantation of his birth until his death on July 4, 1826.2 By
birthright, Jefferson was a Virginia aristocrat in taste,
education, and upbringing. It was his involvement in
politics and his study of the European Enlightenment that
shaped his ideological principles. Jefferson was a man of
many talents. Both a politician and philosopher, he was also
fascinated with science and was an avid inventor, architect,
educator, geographer, ethnologist, and agriculturist.
It was his role in the winning of American independence
and the formation of its government for which he is so
widely known. To understand the motives for the actions that
led to this fame, many aspects of Jefferson’s complicated
and tumultuous life must be understood. Given the scope of
the research of this paper, the facets of Jefferson’s life
examined will of necessity be limited to four basic areas.

1

Jefferson, Thomas. Complete Anas of Thomas Jefferson. New York: De Capo
Press, 1970. p. 15
2
IBID
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First, an analysis of his enlightened upbringing will be
addressed to provide background into the shaping of his
mentality. Second, his views that an ideal republican
society should be agrarian based. Third, his hatred of
national debt and his belief that the “earth belongs to the
living”. Fourth, the synthesis of these various factors and
how they came to shape his desire for a defensive military.
Education and Formative Years
The first seven years of Jefferson’s life was spent on
the James River a few miles north of Richmond, Virginia. It
was here that Jefferson began his education at the “English
School”.3 At the age of nine he began to undertake the study
of Greek and Latin under the direction of Reverend William
Douglas. After the death of his father on August 17, 1757,
Jefferson began to receive instruction from Reverend James
Maury, for whom he had a great admiration.4 He developed a
mastery of classical languages and found great delight in
the study of ancient Greek and Roman works of literature. In
March 1760 he began his education at the College of William
and Mary from which he graduated two years later. In
Williamsburg he received his first experience observing
government in action. With his study of the classics and
3

Peterson, Merrill ed., Thomas Jefferson: A Reference Biography. New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1986. p. 2
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legal history, he was well prepared for an occupation in the
interpretation of law when in 1767 he was admitted to the
bar.5 He maintained the career despite his relative dislike
of court practice until the eve of the revolution when he
abandoned it.
In 1770 Jefferson was appointed county lieutenant of
Albemarle. The previous year he had become a member of the
House of Burgess and remained in that capacity until its
demise in 1775.6 Jefferson, a poor public speaker, found it
better to put his talents to use as a literary draftsman and
did great services in legislative bodies and on committees.
In this capacity Jefferson proved instrumental in aiding the
formation of the Virginia Committee of Correspondence and
was selected to be a member of that eleven-man committee.
His actions in the pre-revolutionary movement progressed
steadily and culminated in the writing of A Summary View of
the Rights of British America. Besides the Declaration of
Independence this is considered by many to be Jefferson’s
most important Revolutionary work. Its purpose was to
present to the world community an apology for the actions
taken by the American colonies against Great Britain.

4

Randall, Willard. Thomas Jefferson: A Life. New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1993 p 16 & 21
5
Colbourn, H. “Thomas Jefferson’s use of the Past.” William and Mary
Quarterly. 15 (1958): p 59.
6
Jefferson, Complete Anas, p 17
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In A Summary View of the Rights of British America,
Jefferson argues the combined grievances set forth by the
colonies. As he put it “humbly to hope that this their joint
address, penned in the language of truth, and divested of
those expressions of servility which would persuade his
Majesty that we were asking favours, and not rights, shall
obtain from his Majesty a more respectful acceptance.”7 Until
this point, each respective colony had its own agenda for
splitting with England. This work created a unified
justification for why the colonies had the right to revolt
and listed what crimes parliament and the King had committed
against them. Throughout it, Jefferson made use of the
rhetoric of John Locke, arguing that the once free colonists
were being ruled and governed by England in a manner to
which they did not consent and which thereby violated their
natural rights as prescribed by nature. Jefferson made great
use of the argument that the legislative assemblies tasked
by law with governing the colonies could not be superceded
by Parliament, the specific example being the suspension of
the New York state Legislature. As Jefferson explained,
“One free and independent legislature herby takes upon
itself to suspend the powers of another, free and

7

Jefferson, Thomas. A Summary view of the Rights of British America.
reprinted from the original edition. New York: B. Franklin, 1971. p 13
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independent as itself; this exhibiting a phenomenon unknown
in nature.”8 He argued that the crown should use its veto
power to prevent the passage of laws by one legislature
within the empire that might in anyway disrupt the rights
and interests of another. Throughout this pivotal early
work, Jefferson also made ironic use of the rights of free
trade and commerce. He argues, “That the exercise of a free
trade with all the parts of the world, possessed by the
American colonists, as of natural right, and which no law of
their own had taken away or abridged, was next the object of
unjust encroachment.”9 This exhibits one of the earliest
public references Jefferson made in defense of American
commerce. This early trend favoring the protection of
American commerce foreshadows his later policy of using
America’s commerce instead of war as a lever to sway
European policy. Jefferson would, throughout his career,
work to improve and expand American trade. He always feared
the possibility of this trade inducing international
disorder and conflict for the new nation.
In 1779, Jefferson was elected wartime governor of
Virginia. Four years later he was elected to Congress and
remained there until assuming the role of Ambassador to

8
9

IBID p 20
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France in 1785.10 The next four years in France he
established a fondness for that country that would, in many
ways, influence his political and diplomatic views. Upon his
return to America, he assumed the position of Secretary of
State under President George Washington. He would resign
this position within three years, only to be elected Vice
President of the United States under John Adams. Public
support for Jefferson’s liberal democratic sentiments won
him the Presidency of the United States in 1801, which he
repeated in 1805. His second term ended on March 4, 1809,
and he never again journeyed outside of his native state. He
chose to continue to influence and disseminate his ideas
through the medium of letter writing.11
Jefferson’s political experience and academic
upbringing was shaped by the teachings and philosophy of the
European enlightenment, with its roots imbedded in the
classical political and philosophic notions of the Greeks
and Romans.12

These factors propelled Jefferson toward

republicanism. Jefferson’s personal tendencies outside the
world of academics also influenced his policies. This led to

10

Banning, Lance. The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party
Ideology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978. p. 215
11
Spivak, Burton. Jefferson’s English Crisis: Commerce Embargo and the
Republican Revolution. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1979. p. 3 & 199
12
Shalhope, Robert. “Thomas Jefferson’s Republicanism and Antebellum
Southern Thought.” The Journal of Southern History. 42 (1976): p 531.
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a fear of military engagements and centralized power in
general.13
Jefferson throughout his life was a disciple of the
eighteenth century notion of warfare. In essence, war was an
act between two governments and not their inhabitants.
According to Jefferson, war was a limited rational
instrument of policy to be used expressly for limited
objectives after all other options had been exhausted.14 At
the same time this followed the optimistic view of the
enlightenment that all aspects of human actions can be
controlled by rationality, even war. Once declared,
Jefferson argued that war must at all costs be conducted in
a civilized manner. Although he recognized the occasional
need for war, he viewed it as a measure of last resort
because of the extreme long-term economic consequences it
could have on the citizenry. Many of his ideological views
were tempered by his practical experience in the political
arena in his formative years. Many of the ideals fostered by
enlightened thought were quickly dispelled by his experience
13

Peterson, Merrill ed., The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson.
Annapolis: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, 1993. Note: Many
examples of Jefferson’s inherent distrust of centralized governments and
federal authority can be seen throughout his letters and speeches. Of
particular example here see the following letters. The page numbers the
letters occupy in this collection, as well as there titles and the
addressee will be provided. “The Earth Belongs to the Living”, to James
Madison, September 6, 1789, p 100; “More on a Bill of Rights”, to James
Madison, March 15, 1789, p 90-91; “Strengthening the State Governments”,
to Archibald Stuart, December 23, 1791, p 105.

14

in politics. In particular was the view that through
rationality all humans and their endeavors will progress to
a level of perfection found in nature.15
Jefferson’s Republic
The ideal form of government envisioned by Jefferson
was the republic. As he explained in a letter to PierreSamuel

Du

Pont

de

Nemours

on

July

14,

1807,

“What

is

practicable must often control what is pure theory: and the
habits of the governed determine in a great degree what is
practicable.”16 Because the citizens of a true republic are
indeed

the

masters

of

there

own

lives,

they

should

be

trustworthy, educated, and above all socially evolved enough
to handle governing responsibilities. The citizens Jefferson
refers to here are expected to be small landowning farmers.
In

a

true

Jefferson

enlightened
wrote

that

fashion,
only

the

born

of

agrarian

simplistic

and

ideals,

productive

occupation of farming or planting was righteous enough to be
suitable for a citizen in the republic. Echoed since the
times

of

Aristotle,

town

dwellers

and

those

engaged

primarily in industry and commerce have been seen as morally
inferior

to

farmers.

This

philosophy

14

is

based

upon

the

IBID “Your Prophecy and Mine”, To John Adams, January 11, 1816, p 181
IBID “ Limits of the Practicable”, To P. S. Dupont de Nemours, January
18, 1802, p 145
16
Appleby, Joyce, “What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of
Thomas Jefferson?” William and Mary Quarterly. 39 (1982): p 294
15
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notion that the simple lifestyle, with its lack of selfmotivated competition, is more pure and thus closer to the
natural world as explained by John Locke and prescribed to
by Thomas Jefferson. In Locke’s explanation of nature, “To
understand political power aright, and derive it from its
original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally
in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their
actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they
think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature without
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.”17
Jefferson

equated

simple

farming

to

being

as

close

as

possible in the current state of man, to being one with the
natural world, far from the corruption and greed that grows
and feeds in cities and urban populations.
Jefferson focuses his general attitudes about
government and the military in a letter to Elbridge Gerry on
January 26, 1799. Entitled A Profession of Political Faith,
Jefferson explains:
“… I am for a government rigorously frugal & simple, applying all
the possible savings of the public venue to the discharge of the
national debt; and not for a multiplication of officers & salaries
merely to make partisans, & for increasing, by every device, the
public debt, on the principle of it’s being a public blessing. I am

17

Locke, John. Locke on Politics, Religion, and Education. New York:
Collier Books, 1965. p. 20
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for relying, for internal defense, on our militia solely, till
actual invasion, and for such a naval force only as may protect our
coasts and harbors from such depredations as we have experienced;
and not for a standing army in time of peace, which may overawe the
public sentiment; nor for a navy, which by it’s own expenses and
the eternal wars in which it will implicate us, will grind us with
public burdens, & sink us under them. I am for free commerce with
all nations; political connections with none; & little or no
diplomatic establishment.”18

Immediately following the American Revolution,
Jefferson sought to create his ideal agrarian republic in
his home state of Virginia. It was widely believed that only
strong centralized governments could effectively administer
large areas. In essence, Jefferson did not yield to the
notion that the United States was a Republic, but rather an
alliance of thirteen smaller republics. The grand republican
experiment would unfold in each of the colonies and
Jefferson was of course focused on that evolution in his
home state. A key factor in the establishment of a new
republic was the abolition of the monarchy and all its
tendencies. What Jefferson feared above all else was
governmental control. In keeping with the ideals of the
revolution, he firmly believed that revolution was a good
18

Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Jerry, 26 January 1779, Letters.
Jefferson, Thomas, 1743-1826. Charlottesville:(University of Virginia
Library Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library.) 1993.
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and necessary thing. If the power of the government was
indeed derived from the consent of the people being
governed, then if the populous decided that the government
was no longer working for them and protecting their rights,
then they were entitled and even required to revolt.
The Earth Belongs to the Living
Another key building block of Jefferson’s outlook that
would shape his military and maritime doctrine was his
disapproval of a national debt. Throughout a significant
portion of his life, Jefferson was plagued with a neverending debt that deeply troubled him. In a letter to
Nicholas Lewis in 1787, Jefferson wrote, “The torment of
mind I endure till the moment shall arrive when I shall not
owe a shilling on earth is such really as to render life of
little value.”19 Jefferson began to argue vehemently that
Americans should eliminate the debt incurred in previous
wars prior to engaging in another. Elected to the Presidency
in 1800, Jefferson continued to dwell on the abolition of
the increasing American debt left over from the four years
of government spending at the hands of the Federalist under
John Adams. His stringent economic plans, created by Albert
Gallatin, were designed to radically reduce government

http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/Jefferson (hereafter cited as Letters,
followed by the section number,) 1056-57.
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spending and lower the debt. At the heart of this decrease
in government spending was the downsizing of the fledgling
American military. In his first inaugural address delivered
on March 4, 1801, Jefferson eludes to the impending change
when he remarks,
“the vital principle of republics, from which is no appeal but to
force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a
well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the
first moments of war till the regulars may relieve them; the
supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the
public expense that labor maybe lightly burthened; the honest
payment of our debts and sacred preservation of the public faith;
encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaiden…”20

If this was indeed a hint of things to come, then
Jefferson’s First Annual Message delivered on December 8,
1801, was the explanation to the public of just how much he
was going to dismember the military. With respect to the
army, Jefferson envisioned almost totally disbanding the
professional regular army and relying on well-organized
militia to repel or halt invaders long enough to allow
regular troops to be mustered, trained, and dispatched to
permanently repel the enemy. As he explained, “For defense
19

Stuart, Reginald. The Half-way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson’s View of
War. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. p. 13
20
First Innaugural Address, 4 March, 1801. Addresses, Messages and
Replies. Jefferson, Thomas 1743-1826. Charlottesville: )University of
Virginia Library Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library.)
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against invasion, their number is as nothing; nor is it
conceived needful or safe that a standing army should be
kept up in time of peace for that purpose.”21 At the same
time, Jefferson expressed the need for continued training
and development of the militia system and the procurement
and storage of the weapons and military goods needed should
war erupt.
Even more a budgetary target than the army, the navy
was to suffer the greatest program cuts and redesign under
the new administration. Under the Federalist’s influence,
the navy had begun to grow with the construction of several
new warships and the approval of funds for a number of 74gun ships-of-the-line. Under the direction of the Secretary
of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, construction of these ship
designs and the locations for construction had begun to
progress to the point of commencement. Jefferson was
critical of these ships and the expense they incurred. As he
put it, “Whatever annual sum beyond that you may think
proper to appropriate to naval perpetrations, would perhaps
be better employed in providing those articles which may be
kept without waste or consumption, and be in readiness when

1993. http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/Jefferson (hereafter cited as
Addresses, Messages and Replies, followed by section number), 495
21
IBID
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any exigence calls them into use.”22 He immediately set about
decreasing or suspending all together the funding of such
programs. The only naval expenditure Jefferson was in favor
of was the maintenance of a small fleet with which to keep a
presence in the Mediterranean. Here, the United States had a
long and constant antagonism with the Barbary States of
North Africa.
The only building program actively encouraged by
Jefferson was the construction of the “Gunboat Fleet”. These
small open vessels armed with only one or maybe two cannon
would be useful only for harbor defense in conjuncture with
land-based coastal fortifications. These small strictly
defensive vessels were well suited to the Jeffersonian
mentality of maintaining a strictly defensive military arm.
Jefferson argued that these vessels could be cheaply
maintained and stored ashore and manned by a maritime style
militia until war was imminent. It was his opinion that
there was no way this type of naval arm could in any way
take actions abroad that could drag the United States into a
global maritime conflict.23 Further discussion about the

22

Fist Annual Message, December 8, 1801. Addresses, Messages and
Replies. 506
23
Special Message on Gun-Boats, To the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States, February 10, 1807. Addresses,
Messages, and Replies, 541-542
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gunboats and their effectiveness will be addressed in a
later chapter.
The largest military expenditure favored by Jefferson
was the construction of defensive coastal works at strategic
points around important harbors and ports. In Jefferson’s
eyes they represented the epitome of strictly defensive
military policies. They can in no way project military force
or policy upon another nation. Once constructed, they would
cost only a bare minimum to maintain with volunteer
garrisons. Yet at the same time, should war ever necessitate
their activation, they would offer the greatest and most
direct protection of home and hearth. In this manner, they
were the apex of the virtuous military expenditure; works of
defense constructed in the direct presence of the population
and manned by that populace when their sovereignty was
threatened by unwarranted hostility.
The fear of debt that resulted in these military cuts
was a personal lifestyle dilemma faced by Jefferson. Being
the intellectual that Jefferson was, he had to find some way
to formulate this issue into an ideological stance that
could be applied to the natural rights of the citizenry.
This idea was a by-product of Jefferson alone and was
constructed from his background in logical and enlightened
thinking. He became convinced that the generations of

22

mankind were discrete, and that the form and conduct of
public policy should be shaped with this in mind. This
notion of the “Discrete Generation”, or that the earth was
owned by the living, was the cornerstone of Jefferson’s
philosophy regarding a political justification for limiting
the creation of a massive national debt.24 As he put it in a
letter to John Taylor in May, 1816, “by the laws of the
Creator of the world, to the free possession of the earth he
made for the sustenance, unencumbered by their predecessors,
who, like them, were but tenants for life.”25 Jefferson
argued that no generation had the right to create a debt by
which the benefits of that debt were received by that
generation whilst its payment was incurred upon another. In
essence, no generation had the right to create a debt larger
than what it was capable of paying off itself, thus
relegating another to the servitude of the debt created by
its predecessor. In Jefferson’s own words, it would
“… exclude at the threshold of our new government the contagious
and ruinous errors of this quarter of the globe, which have armed
despots with means, not sanctioned by nature, for binding in chains
their fellow men. We have already given in example one effectual
check to the Dog of War by transferring the power of letting him

24

Smith, Daniel. “Population and Political Ethics: Thomas Jefferson’s
Demography of Generations.” William and Mary Quarterly. 56 (1999): p 601.
25
Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 28 May, 1816. Letters. 1392
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loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who
are to spend to those who are to pay.”26

War and Strategy
As demonstrated thus far, Jefferson was a man governed
by rationality and principle. The foundation for this
thought process lies within the doctrines prescribed by the
Enlightenment. Jefferson was an optimist with regard to the
supremacy and potential of rationality. He believed early
on, that all aspects of social existence could be governed
by the confines of rationality and logic. This notion
included war, which Jefferson was a proponent of, given a
suitable situation. The Barbary States of North Africa serve
as an excellent example. Jefferson argued for war with the
states as opposed to payment of tribute for safe passage of
American shipping. In a letter to John Adams in 1786 he
explains:
“… if it is decided that we shall buy peace, I know no reason for
delaying the operation, but should rather think it ought to be
hastened. But I should prefer the obtaining it by war. 1. Justice
is in favor of this opinion. 2. Honor favors it. 3. It will procure
us respect in Europe, and respect is a safe guard to our interests.
4. It will arm the federal head with the safest of all instruments
of coercion over their delinquent members and prevent them from
using what would be less safe….”27

26
27

Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 6 September 1789. Letters. 1034
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 July 1786. Letters. 855
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Jefferson viewed war as an extension of public policy, a
tool for the populous and thus the government. Much of his
early ideology can be seen in the Declaration of
Independence. In it he stated that because Britain’s
legislature had attempted to establish absolute rule by
force of arms, an appropriately reciprocal response was
justified and needed. This work came as a result of the
clash between British troops and colonial militia at
Lexington on April 19, 1775.28 He argued that the colonies
were not engaging in hostilities for aggression or conquest,
but rather as a response of hostilities enforced upon them.
This provided the justification for armed resistance by
arguing it was simply an action taken to preserve the
colonies’ prescribed rights.
This psychological need for the war to appear just and
merely defensive stems a great deal from western Christian
doctrine. As St Augustine explained:
“…a good ruler will wage wars only if they are just. But surely,
if he will only remember that he is a man, he will begin by
bewailing the necessity he is under of waging even just wars. A
good man would be under compulsion to wage no wars at all, if there
were not such things as just wars. A just war, moreover, is
justified only by the injustice of an aggressor; and that injustice

28

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of the United
States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana

25

ought to be a source of grief to any good man, because it is human
injustice. It would be deplorable itself, apart from being a source
29

of conflict.”

Religious motivation not withstanding, Jefferson’s
motive for subscribing to this concern was two fold. First
by applying traditional Christian doctrine and teachings to
the American situation he appealed to a mentality and way of
thinking engrained in the moral and subconscious character
of the vast population, both in America and Europe. This
provided a common thread to link many different groups of
people behind a common understanding and interpretation of
the events transpiring in the American colonies. Second, it
provided a supplementary basis for the notion voiced by
Jefferson that fighting a strictly defensive campaign was
just and rational. Not only was this type of conflict more
pure and exalted, but it also represented the bare minimum,
militarily, needed to preserve the natural order and rights
of an oppressed citizenry. Jefferson placed a great deal of
emphasis on national pride and honor. This type of military
operation provided a noble and just non-aggressive aspect of
armed resistance. For as Augustine explained, “… victory can
be mortally poisoned by pride,” and, if the outcome of the
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war is to provide peace, then it has accomplished the sole
positive outcome war can achieve.30
Overall, Jefferson saw war as a limited instrument to
achieve specific ends. He recognized that it was an
extension of human nature and if that were the case, it too
could be placed under control with reason and logic. In this
manner he was willing to argue that wars were necessary,
lawful, just, and even useful in the scheme of nature. Given
the rhetoric necessary to incite the colonies into armed
rebellion against England, it was required that a conscious
and morale approval mechanism for war be disseminated
through the revolutionary propaganda. This philosophy seemed
to foretell the military philosophies later argued by
strategic thinkers Carl von Clausewitz and Baron Henri de
Jomini. Having themselves come from the same Enlightened
education as Jefferson, they developed similar ideas about
the nature of warfare. Jomini, like Jefferson, argued that
war was an integral part of civilization. Being a true
disciple of the 18th century notion of warfare, he believed
that through laws and reason, the destruction that resulted
from war could be kept at a bare minimum. By restricting the
aims of war to the destruction of the enemy force at the
29
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coveted decisive battle, damage inflicted upon the
infrastructure and populous was kept at a minimum.
Clausewitz was of similar opinions but his concept and
notion of warfare transcended many of the eighteenth century
limitations. In a way, Clausewitz presents himself as being
much more pragmatic than either Jomini or Jefferson.
Clausewitz argues that “War is a mere continuation of policy
by other means,” and that “All wars may be regarded as
political acts.”31 In doing this he does not limit the scope
of war to limited fashion seeking only the decisive victory,
or to strategically defensive combat seeking only to
preserve the status quo. Rather, Clausewitz argues that
there is a realm in which the notion of total warfare is
needed. This principle of waging unrestricted warfare upon
the citizenry of a nation itself was in stark contrast to
Jefferson and Jomini. This “diversity in the nature of wars”
expressed by Clausewitz argues that “the greater and more
powerful the motives of war, the more they affect the whole
existence of the nations involved.”32 In essence the more a
warring faction has to gain or lose as a result of combat
will dictate the level and scope to which they will wage war
on an enemy. If the aims of warfare are limited and
30
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specific, as Jefferson tended to argue, then so will the
level and intensity of the combat. However, if the goal is
for the preservation of the state or the complete
destruction of an enemy state, then the realm of combat must
permeate through all levels of that society. By presenting
arguments for both styles of warfare, Clausewitz and his
doctrines have superceded those of Jomini and Jefferson, and
are still studied to this day.33
Commerce
Jefferson wished to place an ideological check on the
reliance of war to solve all political disputes. He argued
that although war had its purpose, and was useful, it was
the measure of last resort. As explained earlier, the ideal
government Jefferson envisioned was the agrarian based
republic. He envisioned no large industrial urban
populations, which would represent an immoral and selfabsorbed corruption in the ideal society. As such, Jefferson
was adamantly opposed to production except to the level of
providing the new nation with required manufactured goods.
Jefferson felt that the only other acceptable alternative to
farming as a profession was that of an occupation on the
32
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ocean. This idea he did not come at alone but rather from
his responsibility to reflect and honor the wishes of the
people.
He wrote to John Jay in August 1785,
“… We now have lands enough to employ an infinite number of people
in their cultivation. Cultivators of the earth are the most
valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most
independent, the most virtuous, & they are tied to their country &
wedded to it’s liberty & interests by the most lasting bonds. As
long therefore as they can find employment in this line, I would
not convert them into mariners, artisans, or anything else. But our
citizens will find employment in this line till their numbers, & of
course their productions, become too great for the demand, both
internal and foreign. This is not the case as of yet, & probably
will not be for a considerable time. As soon as it is, the surplus
of hands must be turned to something else. I should then perhaps
wish to turn them to the sea in preference to manufactures, because
comparing the characters of the two classes I find the former the
more valuable citizens. I consider the class of artificers as the
panders of vice & the instruments by which the liberties of a
country are generally overturned. However we are not free to decide
this question on principles of theory only. Our people are decided
in the opinion that it is necessary for us to take a share in the
occupation of the ocean, & their established habits induce them to
require that the sea be kept open to them, and that that line of
policy be pursued which will render the use of that element as
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great as possible to them I think it a duty in those entrusted with
the administration of their affairs to conform themselves to the
decided choice of their constituents and therefore we should in
every instance preserve an equality of right to them in the
transportation of commodities, in the right of fishing, & in the
other uses of the sea.”34

This being the case, Jefferson hoped that the United
States might serve primarily as a supply of natural
resources for the industrialized nations of Europe. This
followed the mercantile style economy that had existed in
the colonies while under British control. Under this system
Jefferson argued for no more a sea borne military than would
be required to protect American shipping from pirates, in
particular those along then Barbary Coast of Africa. A few
naval vessels would be kept at sea to act as a deterrent to
would be violators of American commerce and pride, while the
rest would be maintained in ordinary, reducing cost, until
they were needed by imminent war. Trade, Jefferson argued,
should be free with all nations and not be obstructed by the
politics or wars of belligerent nations. He hoped that the
ever-present hostility between the European nations would
provide vast markets for American goods, yet he hoped those
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nations’ sea going forces would not interfere with American
neutrality and commerce.35
Jefferson hoped this dependency on American commerce
would provide the fledgling nation with an ideal weapon with
which to exert policy upon European nations. He argued that
if properly managed, the regulation or suspension of
American trade to any major nation would be detrimental
enough to that country’s economy to compel them to yield to
American interest. With this weapon, only a sizable enough
force with which to prevent limited acts of aggression on
American shipping would be required. As he explained in a
letter to John Jay, “…I think it to our interest to punish
the first insult, because an insult unpunished is the parent
of many others.”36 Essentially Jefferson hoped a small
capable naval force would be adequate to deter or address
any limited attacks upon American sovereignty upon the sea.
Should this not be possible, and war erupt, he contemplated
that it would be with one of the larger European nations, in
particular England. He hoped that the commerce control
mechanism, would serve as great a force in that country’s
economy as a naval defeat would serve on the sea. At the
same time, the lack of a large naval force would be less
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likely to cause tension that could inadvertently lead to
war.
In summation Jefferson created and maintained a trinity
between commerce, war, and debt. He did not fear or dislike
war so long as it was on a limited scale and fought in a
civilized eighteenth century manner. What he did oppose was
national debt, which was the by-product of any war,
especially with the creation and maintenance of a
professional standing military complex. Of these, the navy
represented the least cost effective and most likely to
involve the United States in a foreign war. As he described
in a letter to John Jay, August 23, 1785, “… (The navy)
being the only weapon with which we can reach an enemy.”37 He
was arguing in this letter, for the creation of a small
naval force with which to defend national pride and honor,
in direct response to attacks made upon American shipping by
pirates. At the same time, it demonstrates his opinion that
the navy is the only means with which to engage in an
offensive posture with a nation. He feared that if the navy
was constructed to large, that besides being too costly, it
would present Europe with and excuse to engage in
hostilities with America.
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He labored extensively to prevent the burden of debt he
saw the British taxpayer encumbered for, for the sake of
maintaining her massive fleet. In doing so he developed the
theory that through restricted commerce, not naval armament,
peace could be maintained and enforced. This commerce should
be tasked with moving primarily agricultural surplus, upon
which he hoped other nations would depend. This would keep
America morally superior by being agrarian based while at
the same time he hoped an economic equilibrium would develop
where, as dependant on foreign manufactured goods as the
U.S. would be, so would they be to American agriculture.
Jefferson hoped this would result in America and Europe
policing their own home waters respectively. To explain this
theory ideologically, Jefferson created the “Discrete
Generation” theory, which essentially argued that one
governing generation does not have the authority to incur
debt, or laws, which will impact its posterity. This theory
gave his fear of debt, and the resulting reduced military
expenditures, philosophical and political legitimacy.
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CHAPTER 3
MARITIME AND NAVAL STRATEGY

Before a discussion can take place on what an effective
maritime strategy is, it must first be defined.38 Maritime
goes beyond naval strategy in that the latter primarily
focuses on issues dealing with preservation of the battle
fleet, its logistics for operation, and strategy for
success. The end to all of this is what is principally the
militant side of maritime strategy. Beyond the navy is the
regulation and preservation of commerce, lines of
communication other than strictly military, the protection
of the population, the protection and maintenance of the
interior lines of communication, and trade with which
imported and exported goods are transported.39
Alfred Thayer Mahan was a Captain in the United States
Navy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In 1890 he published The Influence of Sea Power Upon History
1660-1783. This work, along with others he published, became
regarded as the definitive works in the arena of naval
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warfare and strategy. His thesis that an effective navy was
the cornerstone for every major world power was received
greatly by naval proponents all over the world. In America,
his work helped change the traditional stigma of anti-naval
sentiment so prevalent in the American military mentality.
As Mahan explained there are two principle reasons why a
nation would wish to pursue a navy. “The necessity of a
navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs,
therefore, from the from the existence of a peaceful
shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a
nation which has aggressive tendencies and keeps up a navy
merely as a branch of the military establishment.”40 First
and foremost a naval arm’s primary purpose is to protect the
sea borne commerce of a nation state. The sea serves as a
vast open highway through which materials, either raw or
processed, may be transported in the most efficient manner.
Its relative lack of natural obstacles to limit travel
hinders the ability to strategically mass forces with which
to protect commerce.41 As a result, in order for a state to
protect its interests abroad, a mobile and effectual force
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must be maintained with which to travel and respond to
incidences of violence committed against commerce.
Second, a navy may be created and maintained for the
principle use as a weapon of conquest if the intentions of
that state warrant it.42 Few examples can be provided of this
sentiment in the strictest use of the definition. Most
nations capable of mounting a fleet for this purpose also
have commercial fleets they wish to see protected. The most
direct examples are states with a primarily piratical sense
to their foreign policy. Examples of this sort are numerous,
the most well known to American historians being the Barbary
pirates in the Mediterranean. Their principle use of naval
force was for the purpose of harassing merchant ships and
making profit from tribute paid to them by nations for not
committing acts of piracy. In essence instead of having a
navy to protect their commerce, they generated revenue by
being paid by other nations not to attack shipping. Paying
this tribute, many nations argued, was cheaper than arming
and dispatching naval forces to deal with the acts of piracy
being committed.
For obvious reasons, the first scenario for the
justification and need and establishment of a naval arm will
be the one discussed and used here. For the early part of
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American history, it was a matter of national mentality that
a Republic would not wish to conquer. Incidentally, the
means to do it were not present at such an infantile
technological and logistical level of maturity. This being
in mind, the next concept to be reviewed will be the forms
of naval and maritime implementation. In essence there are
two aspects that manifest maritime defense; ships and
defended harbors. Each of these topics will be addressed in
its respective chapter, but the underlying strategic nature
of the two will be discussed here.
First, ships are the direct tactical force-projecting
implements of naval power. They constitute that aspect of
naval strategy that is designed to project forward from
protected bases and inflict damage upon an opponent.43
Although apparently an offensive weapon, in that they are
designed to go forward from a nation over distances and take
the war to the enemy, this is only a limited description of
what there larger scope and purpose is. Fleets serve
strategically as a defensive weapon in that they are
designed to go forward and protect commercial shipping and
homeports for the continued operation of the fleets. In this
sense no matter how tactically offensive the actions may be,
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they are still strategically defensive in that they serve as
the first layer of defense for the national, commercial, and
economic security of a state. So long as the purpose of the
navy is to engage an opposing naval force or commerce then
that role is defensive. As soon as that fleet is tasked with
the responsibility of attacking and invading an enemy’s
country its role changes to essentially an offensive role.
In this scenario the fleet becomes the engineering platform
of the construction and utilization of new bases of
operations, and the general disruption of the infrastructure
of another nation.
Second, adequate harbors and their fortifications
although defensive in nature, in reality serve the opposite
role. For all practical purposes they serve as the strategic
offensive weapon for the nation, for without secured home
bases, navies cannot function. Mahan states that the most
important strategic goal of a naval force is to ensure the
protection and preservation of commerce, but also lines of
communication. If it were not for adequate harbors, interior
lines of communication, and transportation necessary for the
continued movement of goods and information throughout the
interior of a country, then a naval force would not be
warranted. The defense of harbors by the force-projecting
navy, in conjuncture with coastal and harbor defenses,
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serves as a defensive measure for the strategically
offensive goal of maintaining commerce and communication. As
Mahan explained:
“The offensive strength of a seaport, considered independently of
its strategic situation and of its natural and acquired resources,
consist in its capacity:
1. To assemble and hold a large military force, of both ships of
war and transports.
2. To launch such force safely and easily into the deep.
3. To follow it with a continued support until the campaign is
ended.”44

If these represent the fundamental elements and
initiative for a naval arm, it must also be explained what
principle factors affect the sea power of a nation. Mahan’s
doctrine promotes six key factors that play a pivotal role
in the creation of an effective militant maritime force.
These factors are categorized as: I. Geographical Position.
II. Physical Conformation, including, as connected
therewith, natural productions and climate. III. Extent of
Territory. IV. Number of Population. V. Character of the
People. VI. Character of Government.45 The first three
criteria are elements of physical characteristics of a
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state, whereas the latter three reflect the nature of the
people that collectively form the nation state.
Physical characteristics and geography of a state
furnish the foundation for which a people will either be
inclined or hindered from pursuing a naval arm. The actual
geographic position plays the largest role of these aspects
for various reasons. First, if a state is situated so that
it is not threatened by invasion from land, or is pressed to
invade by land, or is any other way compelled to maintain a
large standing army, then it possesses a possible naval
advantage over an adversary that must contend with these
issues. The necessity for a state to divert funds and
resources to many different facets of warfare limit the
overall potential of each branch. Few nations have the
resources and manpower to adequately maintain both armies
and navies of dominating power. Second, the position of a
state may be such that it allows for the concentration or
dispersion of forces. Either of these elements could be
either advantageous or detrimental. France for example has
access to both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, which
would at first glance provide a strategic advantage of
placement. Upon closer review however, her two separate
fleets can rarely operate in joint operations due to their
required transit through the Straights of Gibraltar, a
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strategic bottleneck controlled by enemy forces. For the
U.S. in the early 19th century, the large commercial
activities conducted in both the north and south required
lines of infrastructure on the scale of many two shored
European nations. Strategically, it could have been
disastrous if it were not for the abundant resources in the
country and an effective infrastructure. America’s great
distance from major military forces provides a natural
protection for its infrastructure. Third, the proximity of
an enemy with which to launch raids against her commerce.
Commerce raiding by nature defuses naval forces thereby
requiring closer bases of operations for logistical
purposes. By having ports in close proximity to an enemy,
rapid and disastrous assaults upon an enemy’s commerce can
be conducted with a limited amount of exposure for
retaliation.46
The second condition conducive to the establishment of
a naval force is physical conformation. These are the
characteristics of the shoreline. First, if a country has an
extensive shoreline but no adequate harbors, being deep and
well protected, then extensive commerce and a navy are not
likely. Also, if a nation has sufficient resources to supply
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the population, then they are less inclined to take to the
sea to acquire more.47
The third physical condition is the extent of territory
upon which a nation is placed. The factor significant here
is not so much the square miles encompassed within national
boundaries but rather the length of its coastline and the
character of its harbors. A long seacoast can be a strength
or weakness depending upon the size of the population
encompassed within it. Viewed in this light, a country
resembles a fortress in that its garrison must be adequately
proportional to the area being defended.48
The next set of criteria deal with the social aspect of
maritime defense. The first of these, population, has
already been eluded to in discussion of extent of territory.
Here though, another step is taken in evaluation beyond
merely an adequate number residing in the state. Beyond
population is the percentage that takes to the sea. At the
minimum, what must be considered is the number of those who
are at least readily available for deployment upon the sea
and for the manufacture of material needed for naval use.49
Second, the national character and desire of a nation
to engage in maritime trade are a pragmatic necessity with
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regards to the establishment of a maritime force. If we
accept Mahan’s thesis to be true, that sea power is based
upon peaceful and extensive commerce, then the character of
a nation to be actively involved and prosperous in this
endeavor is paramount. If the primary avenue for the
acquisition of wealth is through commerce, as opposed to
other means, then the nation demonstrating that
characteristic will have an advantage. To illustrate this in
a real world sense Mahan used England, France, and Spain as
examples. France he argued relied more on thrift and
hoarding of wealth to secure it, whereas Spain sought her
riches from exploiting the gold and silver mines discovered
in the new world. England on the other hand sought her
fortune as shopkeepers making profits strictly through trade
and commerce, which resulted in a dependency on an efficient
naval and commercial structure far surpassing the other
nations.50
The final aspect that serves as a key to naval
development is the character of the government. Particular
forms of government are more supportive of the development
of maritime authority. Given the republican form of
government practiced in the United States, if it is the will
of the people to have maritime commerce, then it is the
50
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responsibility of the representative government to act upon
these wishes. In a letter already quoted in this work,
Jefferson argues that if it were his decision, he would not
have the people of the new republic pursue the occupation of
seafarers, but he said it was not his decision to make
because it was his responsibility to reflect the desires of
his constituency. Essentially, governmental influence acts
in two ways, the first of which is during peacetime. Policy
can promote the expansion of peacetime commerce and trade
thereby increasing the attachment of the people and the
economy to the sea, or it can attempt to promote industries
that inhibit this expansion. The windfall of this either
creates a need for a navy or reduces it. Ironically this is
was not the situation the United States found itself in
during the War of 1812. Commerce had developed by natural
means, but the navy had been hampered by actions of
governmental policy. The result being the United States was
ill prepared for a naval war.51
This leads to the second influence the government may
have over the navy, during times of war. It is the
responsibility of the government to ensure that in the event
of war, provisions, men, and armament are of sufficient
quantity to provide protection for the merchant fleet. As
51
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mentioned earlier, this is the role in which American failed
prior to the War of 1812.52 Beyond the measures taken at home
to prepare a navy for war, it is also necessary for naval
stations abroad to be prepared for forward deployment of
fleets. As such, three vital links have been established
through which a government can promote maritime endeavors:
promotion of an active peacetime commercial trade, creation
and maintenance of a sufficient naval force and arms as to
protect the merchant fleet in times of war, and the creation
of forward bases for the distribution of the fleet beyond
the range supported by only domestic ports. As shall be
demonstrated, the maritime defense policy adopted by
Jefferson and the Republicans supported only one of these
three links. This set precedence for maritime inadequacy for
most of the first half of the nineteenth century.
As an addition to this cursory evaluation of maritime
strategy, the infancy of the American government should be
evaluated. To provide a contrast, the study of maritime
policy in antiquity illuminates the limits of what role
naval power can develop at the level of political and
economic maturity analogous to the situation facing America
at its inception. As Chester Starr points out, “…the
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deliberate exercise of sea power depended upon the rise of
firm political units with sufficient resources to support
navies.”53 Thus, a “thalassocracy” requires political and
economic systems that can consciously aim at naval control
of sea lanes for the transport of useful supplies and also
of armies toward that end.”54 Neither of which the U.S.
possessed at its inception.
Mahan’s doctrine argues what measures should be taken
by a nation in order to secure dominance both politically
and militarily, upon the sea. Its primary purpose is to
argue the strategic need and impact of an effective naval
force for victorious nations throughout history. The
guidelines he argues are vital and have been proven correct
in many ways by the study of historical events. Mahan’s
thesis is nonetheless directed at political entities with
much more maturity than the U.S. had at the time being
evaluated here. What Mahan’s doctrine does provide is an
explanation as to why the U.S. suffered such defeats
politically and militarily in the early republic. This in
turn explains a great deal about the political and social
actions taken by the government during these years.
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This is not to serve as a defense or apology for the
policy that was pursued by Jefferson but rather a side note
to aid in explaining the complex situation through which he
developed his policies. Two principle notions are now at the
heart of this evaluation: 1. The U.S. did not have the means
to secure a naval supremacy on the high seas, or even the
capability with which to fight on equal terms her European
adversaries with any hope of success. 2. The U.S., by
following the Jeffersonian maritime defense policy, severely
limited and crippled what resistance it could have fronted
against foreign threats. The consideration of what Mahan
argues and what was actually possible requires a balance of
moderation, which seems to be the key.55
Jefferson’s Strategy
As has been explained already, Jefferson’s economic
plans for the country all but excluded any significant
military, especially a navy. Although there is little doubt
that the nation did not have the resources to create and
maintain and large naval force, the strategy and design of
the naval forces possible were inefficient at best. What is
argued here is that the resources available were not
adequately harnessed and developed by the government under
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Jeffersonian policy. The question here is not whether the
perfect and adequate naval force could be created to rival
the insults delivered by the Royal Navy, but whether the
best possible, given the means available, could have been
adopted to better prepare the U.S. for the defense of such a
large commercial force.
In the event of war, Jefferson favored a strictly
defensive campaign. In a letter to John Jay on August 23,
1785 Jefferson states, “If a war with England should take
place, it seems to me that the first thing necessary would
be a resolution to abandon the carrying trade because we can
not protect it. Foreign nations must in that case be invited
to bring us what we want & to take our productions in their
own bottoms.”56 This illustrated clearly Jefferson’s intent
upon using the refusal of trade with nations as a weapon of
coercion, as opposed to combat. Yet in the same letter he
explains, “Indeed I look forward to the very possible case
of war with an European power, & I think there is no
protection against them but from the possession of some
force on the sea.”57 What can be derived here is that
Jefferson recognized the need for some naval force with
56
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which to secure a defensive measure against possible
European belligerents.
In this sense, Jefferson envisioned a purely coastal
defensive naval arm with which to defend the nation.
American commerce he intended to defend by halting and
allowing transport of goods only upon vessels belonging to
nations seeking trade.58 This he felt would protect American
merchant men from attack and impressment while at the same
time protect the American taxpayer by having the burden of
defense for shipping paid by whatever nationality chose to
export American products upon their own vessels. The
Republicans simply tried to build their strategy around what
they considered the most effective use of national
resources, without the dangers of violating their principles
regarding the expansion of the national debt. It is very
possible that Jefferson adopted this rather uniquely
defensive naval mindset from the French, for whom he had
affection. They developed a strictly frugal and defense
oriented strategy governing the deployment of their fleet,
in stark contrast to Great Britain.59
The test bed for my hypothesis, that the Jeffersonian
maritime defense policy was a failure, will be the tension
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that existed between England and the U.S. during Jefferson’s
administration. My hypothesis is two fold: First, his
reliance on economic persuasion to prevent war failed;
second, with the onset of war with the Madison
administration, the American navy proved ineffectual. Basic
naval strategy having already been summarized, I will now
lie out the general strategic policies of Jefferson citing
examples. This analysis will come in two parts, first the
use of economic measures and second the designed use of
Jefferson’s navy.
The strategic maritime offensive weapon under
Republican ideology, i.e. one that is designed to sway the
opinion and actions of belligerent European nations, was the
regulation of the American commercial force. This maritime
policy had two modes of implementation. First, the use of
economic coercion in the form of a temporary embargo on
American export that served as a defensive precautionary
policy.60 It was designed to withhold American ships,
sailors, and mercantile property from the world’s oceans in
an attempt to keep them out of harm’s way.61 Second, a total
embargo of all exports and imports served as the offensive
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tool of economic persuasion.62 This effectively banned the
importation of foreign goods by congressional law, and the
exportation of all American goods on any vessels, not just
those flying the Stars and Stripes. Essentially these two
systems were designed to influence foreign attitudes toward
American sentiment prior to the last option of war being
used; with a limited embargo preventing the export of
American goods on American vessels, and a total embargo
reflecting a policy of non-intercourse with the intent to
starve into submission a political adversary.
From its beginning, the United States experienced
antagonism upon the high sea from various European
belligerents and the Barbary pirates in North Africa. The
Republican doctrine of free commerce upon the sea set the
stage for a fleet of unprotected wealth laden ships, ripe
for the picking. The instability in Europe that had begun
with the wars of the French Revolution escalated into the
Napoleonic wars. When neither England nor France could
achieve decisive victories, they turned to the sea and began
attacks upon the commerce of noncombatant nations with the
hope of hindering trade, and thus the war effort of each
other.
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Elected in 1801, Jefferson’s first term as President
was focused on the elimination of the national debt,
restoration of republican principles, and the purchase and
exploration of the Louisiana territory. However, the issues
brought on by the wars in Europe dominated his second term
as well as the presidency of his successor. The intensity of
the war in Europe began to escalate after 1805. This led to
a change in priorities in the American government. The
British escalated the practice of impressment of American
sailors to supply their manpower needs in the expanding
wartime navy. It had grown from roughly 36,000 men in 1792
to over 120,000 in 1805. It was estimated that the British
between 1803 and 1806 had impressed 2,798 men.63 The response
from Jefferson and the Republicans was the experimental use
of commercial coercion on a much greater scale than had ever
been attempted. Many variations were tried including the
Non-Importation Act of 1806.64
Many factors combined to create the tense political
atmosphere, which led to the embargo. In particular was the
Leopard/Chesapeake affair. On June 22, 1807 the United
States frigate U.S.S. Chesapeake set sail for a cruise to
the Mediterranean. Waiting off of Norfolk was the British
63
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frigate, HMS Leopard, with orders to seek out the American
frigate and search her for British deserters. When the two
ships made contact, the Chesapeake heaved to and took on a
lieutenant from the British ship. With him was a copy of the
orders to search for deserters and a note from the captain
of the Leopard expressing his desire for peace to be
maintained. After a period of debate in Commodore Barron’s
cabin aboard the Chesapeake, the British officer returned to
his ship with word that the Americans would not cooperate.
After an exchange of words through the hailing trumpets, the
Leopard fired a warning shot across the bow of the
Chesapeake with no effect. The Leopard then moved into
position and proceeded to bombard the American frigate with
broadsides for about ten minutes. Barron surrendered and a
second boarding party was sent aboard the Chesapeake, where
the crew was mustered and four members were taken off and
placed upon the Leopard.65
The response in America was swift and unified, the
public demanded satisfaction. All throughout Virginia,
patrols of militia kept a watchful eye on the British
squadron and prevented the ships from getting supplies. All
over the nation acts of retribution were enacted wherever
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possible. In New York an English ship had its rudder and
rigging removed by an angry mob, and all over the country
public meetings denounced the act against the Chesapeake.
The cry for war against Britain rang loud throughout the
nation. Initially Jefferson tried to damper this emotion and
keep it short of open flame. He hoped the outcry of protest
from the citizens would be enough to compel England to
settle the whole affair and perhaps even compel them to
cease impressments.
Jefferson immediately set about writing the governor of
Virginia urging restraint of actions that may limit the
options available to the Congress by the time of their next
session. Jefferson also issued a proclamation closing off
all American ports to British warships. This satisfied the
need for some type of action while at the same time limiting
the amount of contact between the populous and the British.
Jefferson wished to avert any serious action until the
Congress could meet, thus giving time for tempers to settle
and most importantly allowing time for American merchantmen
to return to their home ports with little fear of being
captured by British warships.
As time progressed, and Jefferson continued to receive
reports regarding the actions of the British squadron
stationed off of Hampton Roads, his demeanor became more
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agitated. The news he received from England was less than
optimistic and soon he and his cabinet were discussing
possible modes of war and an invasion of Canada. Diplomatic
missions to London were unsuccessful and by October,
Jefferson knew that public demand would not be enough to
sway England from her policy of impressment.66
As he explained in his Eighth Annual Message on
November 8, 1808:
“The Communication made to Congress at their last session
explained the posture in which the close of the discussion relating
to the attack by a British ship of war on the frigate Chesapeake
left a subject on which the nation had manifested so honorably and
sensibly. Every view of what had passed authorized a belief that
immediate steps would be taken by the British government for
redressing a wrong, which, the more it was investigated, appeared
the more clearly to require what had not bee provided for in the
special mission. It is found that no steps have been taken for that
purpose. On the contrary, it will be seen, in the documents laid
before you, that the inadmissible preliminary which obstructed the
adjustment is still adhered to; and, moreover, that it is now
brought into connection with the distinct and irrelevant case of
the orders in council.”67
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Congress, in return, allowed the Non-Importation Act to
go into effect and supported the President’s decision to
close off American ports to many British goods and her
warships. Reaction from the leadership in Britain and France
with regard to actions taken by both sides on the high seas
was so dismal that a response to a letter James Monroe sent
to Jefferson regarding the dispatch of another special
session in 1809, earned this reply:
“The idea of sending a special mission to France or England is not
entertained at all here. After so little attention to us form the
former, and so insulting and answer from Canning, such a mark of
respect as an extraordinary mission, would be a degradation against
which all minds revolt here.”68

At this point Jefferson was merely trying to delay
hostilities with England until America could prepare and her
merchant fleet could be recalled. Jefferson was horrified at
the abandonment of limited warfare in favor of the largescale battle fought by Napoleon leading to the slaughter of
so many Frenchman. Jefferson feared that any public mention
of war or preparation for it might insight England to wage
war upon America before she could prepare. In the end, this
ambitious adventure failed to solve America’s commercial
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problems and she was forced to adopt more dramatic measure
as the only way to achieve her political goals.69
It was the Embargo of 1807 that so drastically proved
the futility of a coercive commercial plan. Not only was it
unsuccessful, it effectively served to prevent the growth of
a capable American naval arm and all but ruined the
country’s economy. Jefferson hoped that with the prevention
of importation of English goods, American industry would be
strengthened through self-reliance. He also hoped that the
lack of the American commercial fleet would stagnate the
English economy. In actuality the total embargo resulted in
decreased American production and with the absence of
American commerce, all but created a monopoly of shipping
for the English merchant fleet.
On December 22, 1807, Jefferson signed the Embargo Act
into law.70 The chief aims of the embargo were precautionary
and coercive. Jefferson figured that the embargo coupled
with the Non-Importation act would all but result in British
imperial starvation. Critics claimed that the same could be
said for an American starvation as a result of the new
embargo. Key to the success of the embargo was the almost
unanimous support of it by the people, both to enforce self69
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denial and to make it clear to the British the U.S. would
carry out the embargo as long as was necessary.
The public sentiment soon began to reveal chinks in the
armor of the great economic experiment. Jefferson had
effectually waited too long after the Chesapeake to enact
the embargo. British hatred and resounding patriotism had
begun to diminish. Violations were rampant and the
government could not enforce the law in all ports
simultaneously. Many loopholes in the law were used to allow
shipping, a by-product of its broad definition when signed
into law.
By the fall of 1808, the failure of the embargo was
obvious. Its purpose as a coercive tool had failed due to
bad timing and poor implementation. Had the government been
able to hold on, the embargo may have proven of limited
success, for early in 1809 England appeared to be
reconsidering the importance of trade with America.
Jefferson and the Republicans had drastically over estimated
the reliance of Great Britain upon American goods as well.
In 1808, only 12 million pounds of cotton reached England
from America, which was a drastic drop from the 44 million
pounds, imported the year before. Other foreign markets
quickly stepped up to fill the demand and imported over 30
70
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million pounds that same year.71 Poor regulation, lack of
popular support, and an expanding international market that
could fill the void left by American withdrawal undermined
the pressure that could have been exerted by this form of
economic control.
The results of the embargo were varied. On the domestic
front, economic stagnation was rampant. Sailors seeking
employment left for service on British ships, ironic
considering the role involuntary impressments played in the
coming about of the embargo. Industry, projected to increase
production with a reduction in imported processed goods, saw
a decrease in production. National unity was damaged as a
result of political questions that arose from the embargo.
Sectionalism between North and South increased as economic
issues and political ideologies continued to butt heads.
Most importantly however, it provided an excuse for the
continued neglect of the American military system. With the
failure of peaceful economic coercion, it left only military
options as a way to sway English policy.
Strategic Analysis
Throughout the course of this chapter accepted naval
strategy and purpose has been outlined, as has Jefferson’s
strategic policy involving maritime use. His inability to
71
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abandon eighteenth century notions of warfare, long after
the rest of the world had done so, led to his adoption of a
devastatingly ineffective policy. Two very distinctive flaws
in his strategy have been demonstrated here.
First, Jefferson hoped to use peaceful economic means
as his principle way of exerting influence on belligerent
nations. As Mahan explains on the first page of The
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, “The history of Sea
Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of
contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence
frequently culminating in war.”72 In the course of human
actions, the exertion of force and policy becomes a
necessity in a social environment. Extend this to include
groups and societies, and the guidelines remain relatively
the same. When dialogue and incentives are not enough to
convince another to act in accordance with our wishes, it is
left to physical means to serve as the medium of influence.
The ultimate human activity analogous to this is warfare.
War is the implementation of politics by other means.73 To
rely on any other measure of influence is not necessarily
foolish, for no other means may be available. With this
understood, victory should not be expected. Although
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Jefferson understood the merits of war in a limited sense,
his reliance upon non-military means as the strategic way in
which to exert will, negated the basic and proven mode of
enforcement, war.
Second, Jefferson had two principle policies governing
the navy that proved ineffectual. He hoped to maintain only
an adequate enough naval force to provide limited
capabilities on the high seas to defend honor. Essentially
he argued for a limited notion of maritime warfare, and
should this prove unsuitable against some adversaries, he
could rely on commercial control to influence the will of an
opponent without violent means. The reliance upon gunboats
and the strategic use of the navy being purely defensive was
in direct opposition to Mahan’s strategic doctrine. This
doctrine states that the use of a navy to serve expressly as
a passive defensive force rules out its principle aspect,
its mobility to attack and defend far from the shores that
it is defending.74 This doctrine manifested itself in his
reliance upon small gunboats for an inexpensive naval force
relegated to defense. This aspect will be analyzed greater
in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NAVY AND JEFFERSON

Naval forces constitute one leg of the military aspect
of maritime strategy. This aspect of maritime policy was
most impacted by Jefferson’s policy. Under the Republican
ideology that dominated American politics after the 1801
election, the navy was the most drastically reduced military
establishment. The defensive coastal gunboat navy adopted by
Jefferson severely crippled the nation’s ability to protect
its investments upon the high sea and led to a naval
inferiority to other maritime nations.
The Creation of the Navy Under the Federalists
Under Federalist control, the American government took
great strides in the creation of an active naval arm.
Between 1792 and 1801 the U.S. created a naval force, the
bureaucracy to govern it, and actively participated in two
naval deployments. First was the Quasi-War with France.
America sought to stop, by force, French vessels that were
attacking and harassing American shipping. This conflict saw
the rapid mobilization of American naval power. Second, was
the series of campaigns against the Barbary pirates.
With the end of the American Revolution, the remnants
of the Continental Navy were either scrapped or sold at
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auction. Given the authority granted the Federal Government
under the Articles of Confederation, finances for
establishing any form of combat arm were unattainable. In
1789, the United States Constitution went into effect
creating a new federal government with broader powers. Many
of these new powers dealt specifically with the creation and
preservation of a national naval force. Since gaining its
independence from Great Britain, American merchant ships, no
longer protected by the British navy, were raided by
corsairs in North Africa. The new Constitution was written
with these issues in mind. Article I, Section eight, number
ten of the Constitution tasks the government with the
responsibility to maintain a navy; Article II, Section two
decrees that the President shall serve as Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States.75
Despite the provision in the Constitution, the nation
did not have a navy because the means to create one were not
readily available. By 1790 the situation in the
Mediterranean had escalated. Secretary of War Henry Knox
began to research the cost of creating and maintaining an
adequate force to deal with the Barbary problem.76 His report
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to Congress in 1791 argued for ships of 44-guns, which
constituted a balance to the largest known ships in
possession of the corsairs at the time.77 The Congress
however was of the opinion that a naval militia was adequate
and actively endorsed the shipbuilding trade of the merchant
and fishing fleets. It was widely believed that in the event
of belligerency these vessels could be fitted out for
privateering, saving the money needed to construct a navy.
Privateering and commerce raiding, it was felt, would
destroy enough commerce to cause an opponent to yield to
American interests.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the coast of
North Africa was controlled by series of military
dictatorships located in Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and
Tripoli. These regions were agriculturally inefficient and
had no significant commerce. The leaders relied upon piracy
to supply the national treasuries, which supported their
lavish individual lifestyles. Exacting tribute from nations
in an agreement not to assault their shipping was a common
practice, as was kidnapping and kidnapping fraud.78 Algiers
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was the dominant of the corsairs. Using techniques
reminiscent of the Romans in the First Punic War. The
pirates would come along side an enemy ship and drop great
planks over an enemy’s rail. Attached to the end of these
planks were massive iron spikes that would embed themselves
in the victims’ deck. This would effectively secure the two
vessels together. They would then use these massive secured
planks as bridges to ferry men across and commandeer their
prey.79
Thomas Jefferson, while serving as Ambassador to France
and later as Secretary of State, was of the opinion that war
should be waged against the corsairs. He felt that national
honor demanded a response and by paying tribute in return
for “protection” from piracy showed a sign of weakness that
would later cause the nation more trouble with nations
abroad. From the beginning he argued for a naval force with
which to defend national honor. Jefferson wrote vehemently
to Congress supporting the establishment of a naval arm that
he argued would be no more costly to construct and maintain
than it would be to buy peace from the Algerines.80 Despite
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these pleas, Congress would take no drastic action in
creating a navy in 1790-91.
The Naval Act of 1794
Late in 1793, President Washington brought to Congress
a report from the Secretary of State on the measures taken
to secure peace and ransom of Americans being held captive
by the corsairs. The matter came up as a result of increased
hostility from the Dey of Algiers. The result of the
President’s report and Congress’s ensuing discussion was the
passage of the Naval Act of 1794. This act created the
United States Navy and was signed into law by Washington on
March 27, 1794. It appropriated the funds necessary for the
creation of a naval force. Its purpose as written in its
preamble was to protect American commerce from the
depredations of the Algerine corsairs.81
The act was composed of nine sections that laid out the
mechanism and composition of the new force. It was to be
composed of six vessels, four to carry forty-four guns each,
and two to carry thirty-six guns each. The number and types
of officers to be employed on the vessels was laid out, as
was the number of sailors required for each vessel. Pay and
food rations for the officers and men were included along
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with the provision allowing the President to purchase ships
so long as the number of vessels did not exceed the six
provided for. Of great importance was the final section,
which stated; “Provided always, and be it further enacted,
That if a peace shall take place between the United States
and the Regency of Algiers, that no farther proceeding be
had under this act.”82 This last provision echoed the opinion
of the Congress that the navy should be only a temporary
institution designed to respond to specific threats. The
navy created under this act was expressly that a small force
designed and constructed with a specific mission in mind.
The law having been passed meant the Secretary of War
had to find some way to build a fleet for which no practical
experience in the new country had yet been achieved. Knox
set out to gather shipwrights who may be able to design the
new vessels. Eventually, Joshua Humphreys and a young
English designer by the name of Josiah Fox were tasked with
the responsibility of designing the new American warships.83
They decided upon frigates as the type of vessel to be
constructed. It was decided that four 44-gun ships would be
constructed at yards in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and
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Norfolk. The two 36-gun ships would be constructed at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Baltimore.84 In addition to the
location, size and number of vessels to be built, so to were
their names decided; Constitution, United States, President,
Constellation, Congress, and Chesapeake.
Eighteenth century naval warfare revolved around the
wind powered sailing ships-of-the-line. Ship-of-the-line was
the classification given to warships that were of sufficient
size to be included in the standard naval battle formation
of the period, the battle line. They were constructed of
wood, preferably oak, and were classified as “Rates”.85 Oak
was very strong and resilient, and when properly dried
before use, would serve a long time before beginning to rot.
The Rate classification had six levels, only the first three
were considered suitable to serve in the line. A “first
rate” ship of the line was armed with up to one hundred guns
and a “second rate” ship was armed with ninety to ninetyeight guns. These were the super heavies of naval warfare,
and though few in number they generally served as the
flagships and demonstrated more than any other symbol the
power of a nation. The standard class of fighting ship was
those of the “third rate”. These ships were armed with
84
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sixty-four to eighty-four guns. These ships had two gun
decks and were much more maneuverable and cost effective
than the larger warships. “Fourth rate” ships were armed
with fifty to sixty guns and “fifth rate” ships were armed
with 30 to forty-four guns. Normally in between the “fifth
rate” and the “sixth rate” classes were the frigates.
Frigates mounted between twenty-eight and forty guns mounted
on one gun deck. They were small fast and maneuverable. They
were the most glamorous warships of the time and were
relatively powerful for their size. The smaller ships of the
“sixth rate” mounted between twenty and twenty-eight guns.86
The American frigates took the shape of a single
decked warship and exhibited excellent sailing
characteristics. They were armed more heavily than regular
frigates, and by all measures were regarded as superfrigates when compared to those maintained by other nations.
They were as long as vessels intended to mount seventy-four
guns and they were designed to carry 24-pound long guns
instead of 18-pound long guns.87 The reasoning behind their
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design stemmed from the vast numerical superiority that
almost every other nation had over the U.S. in any possible
naval engagement. American ships were designed to be more
than a match for any ship of comparable size. They were
designed to be able to stay at sea for long periods of time
and perform well in naval slugging matches. They had good
sailing characteristics and speed so they might control the
time of engagement to when it best suited them. The ability
to fight or flight in combat is a formidable advantage and a
necessary survival skill. For this reason they were designed
to outrun anything they could not outfight.
When compared to vessels in other navies, what the
American lacked in numbers they made up with in quality.
British frigates of the 1790s were mostly twenty-eight and
thirty-two gun ships displacing roughly six hundred to one
thousand tons. The larger British frigates that faced the
American’s in the War of 1812 were significantly weaker as
well. The American frigates were the strongest fifth-rates
on the seas. The forty-fours displaced over 1,576 tons and
were armed with thirty 24-pounder long guns on the deck and
twenty-two 42-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and
forecastle. The thirty-sixes displaced 1,287 tons and were

was lost during the War of 1812 because all but two of her long guns had
been removed in favor of short range carronades.
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designed to carry twenty-eight 18-pounders on the gundeck
and twenty 32-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and
forecastle. This increase in firepower was the result of two
factors. First, the increased length of the ship allowed
more gunports to be mounted. Second, they were designed with
a wider and stronger spar deck that was able to act as a
secondary gundeck. Normally the gangways on either side of
the ship that allow transit above the crowded gundeck would
not have supported the weight of additional guns. The
frigates also possessed great defensive strength in the live
oak wood construction that was far superior to the wood used
in English vessels.88
Before these design characteristics could be put to use
and tested, the Dey of Algiers signed a peace treaty on
September 5, 1795. According to the Naval Act of 1794 work
upon the ships was to have stopped with peace having been
secured. Washington, being a supporter of naval expansion,
fashioned a compromise that in the name of public interest
work on the three ships most advanced toward completion
would not be stopped. The three ships completed were the
Constitution at Boston, United States at Philadelphia, and
the 36-gun Constellation at Baltimore. The first of these,
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the United States slid down the ways on May 10, 1797, the
Constellation on September 7, and the Constitution on
October 12.89
The Quasi-War with France
The catalyst that prompted Washington and the
Federalists to act for preservation of the fleet and gave
their argument enough legitimacy to warrant the Republican
compromise was the growing hostility faced by neutral
nations upon the seas. As a result of the French wars of
revolution and the resulting Napoleonic wars, Europe was
embroiled in war from 1793 until 1816. This warfare spread
from the battlefields and battle fleets to the realm of
commerce. England and France both attempted to disrupt the
commerce in and out of each other’s ports. Neutral states,
like the U.S., bore the brunt of this aggression upon the
high seas. The signing of Jay’s Treaty between America and
Great Britain in 1794 was viewed by France as a violation of
the treaties America had signed with her.
It was under these circumstances that John Adams was
elected to the presidency in 1796. On March 2, 1797, the
French directory renounced the principle of “free ships make
89
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free goods”.90 In this renouncement, French privateers and
men-of-war had the right to pursue and board American
vessels and require a roster of all men and their
nationalities on board. The French ship could then legally
capture American vessels failing to have such a list.
Having never enforced this rule, most ships failed to
have it, nor were they given time to get it. The act took
effect immediately, essentially declaring all American
shipping not in homeports to be fair game for French attack.
Seeking a diplomatic solution, President Adams dispatched
John Marshall, Elbridge Gerry, and Charles Pickney on
October 4, 1797, to secure a peaceful solution. The
resulting X.Y.Z. Affair aided in creating the additional
political atmosphere necessary to propagate pro-naval
sentiment in the nation.91
America responded with the Naval Act of July 1, 1797,
which enabled the President to complete and man the three
frigates nearing completion.92 Of the over 5,000 American
commercial vessels at sea in 1797, three hundred were lost
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to French activities. U.S. imports fell from $81,000,000 to
$75,000,000; exports from $67,000,000 to $51,000,000.93

Such

losses were threatening an economic downturn in the U.S. On
May 28, 1798, Adams signed a bill entitled “An Act more
Effectually to Protect the Commerce and Coasts of the United
States." It extended a limited amount of war powers to the
Presidency. Adams used it to order American warships to
recover captured American vessels and to engage French ships
which had committed acts of depredations, or intended to.94
By the end of June 1798, the three American frigates were
almost completely fitted for sea. They were supplemented by
an assortment of converted merchantmen, making the American
Navy set to clear the costal waters and begin actions
abroad.95
The strategy America employed against France changed
over time as the navy developed and grew. Initially, the
navy was a purely defensive force. American warships were
restricted to the waters close to American ports, tasked
primarily with patrolling for French privateers and
93
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warships. Convoy duty for American merchant ships traveling
up and down the American seaboard was also common practice.
During this critical time, American crews and captains were
able to get acquainted with their new vessels and establish
daily shipboard routines in relatively safe waters.
The Navy Department and an Offensive Force
In response to the increasing naval situation and the
likelihood that the size and complexity of management of
naval affairs would soon become to large for the Secretary
of War to maintain, the new cabinet position of Secretary of
the Navy was created. The first man to actively discharge
this position was Benjamin Stoddert who would hold the
position from June 18, 1798, until April 1, 1801.96 Under his
direction the navy would finally have and administrator
whose sole task was the improvement and establishment of an
effective naval arm. He sought to create a navy that would
be able to securely defend American commercial interests
abroad as well deter belligerents from assaulting America
itself.
Stoddert and the rest of the Federalists worked to
increase the size of the navy as quickly as possible. On May
28, 1798, Congress instructed American warships to attack
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any French vessel near American waters that was suspected of
having intent to harass American commerce. This act formally
instigated the Quasi-War with France. The conflict’s
conclusion saw the new American Navy grow to include fiftyfour ships of various sizes. Realizing the time needed for
construction of new ships was too great, Congress set about
purchasing vessels and converting them into warships as a
stopgap navy to supplement the frigates. In fact the first
American warship to set sail was the Ganges on 24 May 1798.
She was a former merchantman purchased by the government for
$58,000 and armed with twenty-four cannon.97 Within a short
period, the government purchased eight merchantmen to
supplement the frigates coming into service. They mounted
anywhere from eighteen guns to twenty-four. When compared to
the later frigates constructed and commissioned in 1799,
such as the John Adams 28 and Essex 32, it can be seen how
comparatively large these vessels were and how vital their
introduction was.98 Of the twenty-two ships in service with
the United States Navy in 1798, eight were former
merchantmen, eleven were small revenue cutters pressed into
service, and of course the three frigates.99 Frigates may
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have served as the backbone of the navy, but it was the
smaller vessels that served as the muscle.
The increasing demand for patrolling cruisers and
escort vessels for American convoys spurred new construction
programs. Despite the length of the hostilities, practically
all new construction of ships was done between 1798 and
1799. During this time the construction and purchase of new
vessels was of the utmost importance to the Navy Department.
At the end of 1797, three ships were in service with the
navy. On July 16, 1798, Congress approved the completion of
the last three frigates originally provided for in the Naval
Act of 1794.100

The Congress, 36 was launched at Portsmouth

on August 15, 1799, the Chesapeake, 36 at Norfolk on
December 2, 1799, and the President, 44 at New York on April
1, 1800.101 By the end of 1798 the navy had grown to twenty
ships, and by the end of 1799 thirty-three. Of these, five
were 44’s, four were 36’s, seven were 32’s, three were 24’s,
seven were 20’s, four were 18’s, and three were 14’s. Nine
galleys and eight revenue cutters supplemented these blue
water vessels.

Also constructed were two 28-gun frigates

and three smaller ships of twenty to twenty-four guns. For
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coastal and harbor defense, two schooners and seven galleys
were also built.102
In addition to these vessels, the merchants of some
major ports constructed five new frigates. Though most were
completed too late to be of any use in the Quasi-War, they
would prove to be useful in later naval activities. The
frigates commissioned as a result of this effort were: the
Philadelphia, New York, Essex, Boston, and John Adams. The
Philadelphia was a thirty-six constructed at New York and
was the largest of the frigates constructed by private
subscription. Her action and destruction at Tripoli account
for some of the most daring exploits in naval history. The
New York was the second largest frigate constructed in this
manner, also at New York. Also rated as a 36-gun ship, she
was slightly shorter than the Philadelphia. She spent much
of her life laid up in ordinary at Washington Navy Yard and
was scuttled when the British attacked the city in 1814.
Third, was the famous Essex. A large 32-gun frigate, she was
constructed at Salem, Massachusetts from funds collected in
Essex County. She would go on to glory in the War of 1812 as
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a commerce raider in the Pacific. She was ultimately
captured by the British frigate Phoebe, 36, and the sloop
Cherub, 18. The Boston was a smaller 28-gun frigate
constructed at Boston and was responsible for the capture of
the French frigate Berceau on October 12, 1800.103 After this
episode she was placed in ordinary at the Washington Naval
Yard and allowed to rot until she was burned in 1814. The
smallest frigate built by subscription and presented to the
Navy was the John Adams, constructed in Charleston, South
Carolina. The small 28-gun frigate saw very little active
life and remained in ordinary, allowed to rot until her
break up at Norfolk in 1829.104
The hostilities with France provided America with the
first victories and defeats for her navy. Three French
warships were captured during the war, the schooner Bon
Pere, the 36-gun frigate L’Insurgent, and another small
frigate the Berceau. The latter of these vessels was
returned to the French but the former two were pressed into
American service under the names Bee and Insurgent
respectively.
Between 1799 and 1800, American activity against the
French saw its climax. During these years the United States
103
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conducted extensive operations in the Caribbean. Stoddert
dispatched what forces he could to the Caribbean for the
winter months. This prevented the ships from being bottled
up by ice and harsh weather off of America’s north Atlantic
coast. An American force that averaged no more than fifteen
ships captured eighty-six French privateers.105 American
vessels operating out of these foreign ports in the area
achieved most of these victories. Only one American warship,
the Retaliation, was lost due to enemy actions.106
The Quasi-War with France was a success for the United
States as well as the navy. Stoddert had proven his worth as
an administrator and leader. With minimal staff he had
managed to fight political pressure and the national fear of
a military long enough to win significant clout for the
United States and her new Navy. He had created a small but
reputable force that proved its capabilities against the
most formidable of European belligerents. In keeping with
his character, Stoddert formulated a proposal to Congress
that included an expansion plan for the navy he felt would
provide security from any aggressor. On February 25, 1799,
Congress passed a Federalist bill of great importance for
the navy. It had three significant measures. First, funds
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were appropriated for the construction of six 74-gun ships.
These vessels would have been America’s first heavy enough
to be considered ships-of-line. Second, $50,000 was
allocated for the construction of two naval docks for
repairing naval vessels. Third, it appropriated $200,000 for
the purchase of timber or land upon which timber was
growing.107 Stoddert argued for forces that could compete in
large naval engagements with European forces. However, his
advocacy for the selling of smaller vessels in order to
prevent the diverting of funds from his impending battleship
fleet was shortsighted. Numerous times during the Quasi-War
smaller vessels of the schooner size were of shallow enough
draft to pursue lesser warships close to shore for capture.
Frigates and vessels of larger size were suited for blue
water operations and patrolling but not for pursuit of
vessels into coastal waters. A balance of small coastal
ships and large blue water vessels was necessary to provide
an effective naval arm capable of handling any maritime
threat.
On February 3, 1801, hostilities with France ceased
with the signing of treaty. Naval expenditures were no
longer at the forefront of American concerns. One of the
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last measures of the Federalist government was the “Peace
Establishment Act” on March 3, 1801.108 In order to save as
much of the enlarged navy as possible, the fleet was
voluntarily cut down from thirty-three vessels to thirteen.
Stoddert pressed for these thirteen to be the frigates and
recommended the selling of the smaller vessels.
Jefferson and the Mediterranean Squadrons
Thomas Jefferson assumed the office of President on
March 4, 1801.109 He brought with him a new administration
and a new economic policy for the nation. His primary
mission was to end large government expenditures and
decrease the national debt. One of the first targets for
restructure and downsizing was the navy. The success and
national pride the navy had obtained during the limited war
with France had helped give itself definition. The navy
would not be eliminated as it had after the Revolution. Due
to pragmatic needs of the navy when dealing with the Barbary
Pirates, several new vessels were constructed while
Jefferson was president. As Jefferson was being sworn in,
threats in the Mediterranean were once again rising. The
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navy would be reduced but it would still be expected to
serve the new administration’s policies as well as it had
the predecessor’s.
Fearing that ocean-going warships may engage the young
republic in another war with a European power, Jefferson
opposed the creation of more vessels with those credentials.
By the end of 1801 the new construction facilities began by
the Federalists were either liquidated or made inoperative.
Preparation for construction of the 74-gun ships was halted
and all materials collected for them were ordered into
storage. The proposed sites for new naval yards served as
the storage houses for these provisions. Many of these naval
stores were not properly attended to and eventually
succumbed to rot and disrepair. Under the “Peace
Establishment Act” the President was allowed to sell all
vessels in the navy with the exception of the thirteen
frigates. Seven of these were scheduled for ordinary while
six were to be kept on active duty but with reduced crews.
Jefferson’s primary goal was to establish a frugal and
efficient government. He decreased the over three million
dollar 1800 Federalist naval budget to just under one
million dollars in 1801.110
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Besides selling vessels and discontinuing construction
and personnel, Jefferson also devised ways to save money
maintaining the fleet he was forced to endure. One of his
most ambitious programs was the creation of a massive dry
dock. He planned an enormous covered dry dock with the sole
purpose of providing a location for frigates to be stored
out of the water and protected from the elements. This he
envisioned would allow vessels to be placed in storage with
no crew yet be immediately called in to service in a perfect
state of readiness. He felt this system would save money in
both repairs and personnel.111 Plans were drawn up and
locations selected but Congress did not approve and it was
never constructed.
On May 17, 1801 the Pasha of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli
declared war on the United States. He felt the amount of
tribute being paid was insufficient. Six days later the
first American squadron was dispatched by Jefferson to the
Mediterranean. The United States had not yet received the
declaration of war but reports of the Pasha’s actions had
already incited much displeasure within the U.S. During the
Quasi-War, the United States frigate George Washington had
the less honorable task of transporting tribute to the Dey
of Algiers. While in port offloading his cargo the Dey
111
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requested that the vessel be used to transport an ambassador
and gifts to the sultan of Constantinople. After much debate
the American captain agreed to serve as a courier service
given the fact that his ship was alone, without support, and
under the guns of the harbor. The mission was made all the
more distasteful given the amount of luggage, human cargo,
and animals required given the diplomatic nature of the
mission.112 Needless to say this was not the appropriate
assignment for an American man-of-war. Upon return to
America, the story presented angered most and helped spur
Jefferson into action.
On May 20, 1801, Jefferson dispatched a squadron that
was far more formidable than what the Barbary corsairs were
accustomed to. Instead of a small lone frigate, Jefferson
dispatched the President 44, Philadelphia 36, Essex 32, and
the schooner Enterprise 12. With the exception of the
Enterprise, the ships of the squadron were too large to
affect a successful blockade. Their large size and deep
drafts prevented them from getting close enough to shore to
prevent small vessels from entering. The Enterprise was the
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only vessel to make a capture during this first deployment,
capturing a Tripolitan 14-gun ship.113
This squadron was relieved by a second, which sailed on
March 10, 1802. Being the only small daft vessel to escape
the auction block, the Enterprise was again assigned along
with the Constellation 36, New York 36, Adams 28, and the
John Adams 28. Once again this force was not suited for
operations against small fast vessels in shallow water.
While capturing and destroying a few vessels, the blockade
was still largely ineffective.114
Observing the lack of success, it was decided that
changes were in order. On February 28, 1803, Congress passed
an “Act Pertaining to the Navy” which authorized the
construction or purchase of four smaller vessels not to
exceed sixteen guns.115 It was decided that two brigs and two
schooners would be added to the fleet. The 16-gun brigs were
to be constructed at Philadelphia and Boston and the two
schooners at Baltimore. Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith
directed three naval officers to oversee construction of the
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vessels and to construct them for suitable service in the
Mediterranean. The two brigs were named the Argus, 16 and
the Siren, 16 and were both completed and sent to the
Mediterranean in late 1803. Of the two schooners, one was
constructed and one was purchased due to time constraints.
The schooner constructed was named Vixen, 12 and was
commissioned on June 25, 1803. The purchase schooner was
renamed Nautilus, 12 and sent to the Mediterranean in
1803.116
These four new ships were assigned to a new squadron
under the command of Edward Preble. Preble in command of the
Constitution, 44 had with him the Philadelphia, 36 as well
as the new vessels and the Enterprise, 12. It was this
mission that reached the Mediterranean on September 13,
1803, that would prove to be the most successful, glamorous,
and costly. On October 31, 1803, Captain Bainbridge of the
Philadelphia sighted a ship trying to slip into the harbor
at Tripoli. Having just dispatched the Vixen he alone was in
position to act. He gave pursuit and his frigate ran hard
aground on an uncharted reef. All attempts to lighten the
vessel enough to float off the reef failed, and after attack
by Tripolitan gunboats and unable to return fire, Bainbridge
surrendered in order to save lives. The three hundred-seven116
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man crew was captured and imprisoned. Unfortunately a few
days later a storm freed the Philadelphia and she was
captured and brought into the harbor at Tripoli.117
Preble, shocked by the events, developed a bold plan to
destroy the frigate and prevent her use by the corsairs.
Using a captured Tripolitan vessel, re-christened Intrepid,
Lieutenant Stephen Decatur along with 80 volunteers,
infiltrated the harbor and set fire to the Philadelphia on
February 16, 1804. Decatur and his men escaped with only one
injury and succeeded in destroying the Philadelphia and
providing the navy with a new hero. As a result of his
actions, Decatur was promoted to the rank of Captain at the
age of twenty-five.118
After this incident, American actions toward Tripoli
increased in intensity. From the Kingdom of Naples, Preble
received six gunboats and two bomb ketches, as
reinforcements after the loss of the Philadelphia. With this
increase in numbers, attempts were made to bombard the city
into submission with little effect. Five separate times
American naval forces bombard the city with little response.
Finally on March 8, 1805, four hundred Arabs and seven U.S.
Marines made a land assault on the city of Derna and
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captured it.119 As a result of the pressure from land as well
as sea and the increasing effect of the American blockade,
Pasha Yusuf Karamanli signed a peace treaty with the U.S. on
June 3, 1805.120
Jefferson and the Gunboat Navy
The largest naval increases made by Jefferson were for
the construction of small gunboats. Jefferson hoped that a
large force of small coastal gunboats stationed at American
harbors would be sufficient to defend American soil when
properly coordinated with coastal defenses. This idea, much
like the “dry dock”, was designed to provide security at a
minimal cost. These small vessels could be stored on land
under cover, protected from the elements and maintained in
perfect state of preservation until they were needed.121
Under the Federalist navy, seven small galleys were
constructed for harbor defense. The navy manned and put the
boats to sea but they proved to be of little value and were
removed from naval service in 1801-2.
In 1800, Secretary of the Navy Stoddert wrote that in
his opinion one 12-gun schooner on the naval establishment
was worth a thousand galleys for naval service under the Act
118
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of May 4, 1798.122 Despite their military record in the
service of the United States navy, Thomas Jefferson
envisioned these small relatively inexpensive vessels as the
backbone of the American coastal defense navy and the
salvation of the American military debt expenditures.123
Citing opinions from General Horatio Gates, Commodore
Thomas Tingy, and Commodore Samuel Baron, Jefferson provided
supporting evidence for this type of vessel.124 Under the
same act that led to the creation of the Argus, Siren,
Vixen, and Nautilus, fifteen gunboats were created for
harbor defense. Congress allocated funds for the
construction of twenty-five in 1805, fifty in 1806, and one
hundred eighty-eight in 1807.125 In 1807, Secretary of the
Navy Robert Smith estimated that it would require two
hundred fifty-seven gunboats to protect American ports along
the Atlantic and in New Orleans.126 Of this number, only one
hundred seventy-six were ever constructed. They proved to be
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rather expensive to maintain and many were constructed of
green wood and were prone to rot quickly.
The gunboats themselves varied in style form place to
place. Having no single designer placed the style of the
vessels in the hands of the local shipwright. Most were
around sixty feet long and armed with one or two large guns,
24-pounders or 36-pounders. Secondary armament usually
consisted of small swivel guns. Some had a single gun
mounted forward and some had one mounted fore and aft. A few
designs even show double mounted cannon on a rotating
platform in the center of the craft.127
The War of 1812
With the assumption to the office of the Presidency by
James Madison on March 4, 1809, little changed with regards
to the navy. A follower of Jefferson, Madison was not
inclined to alter much from the previous executive’s naval
agenda. Given the increased hostility demonstrated toward
American shipping and the impressments of sailors by the
British during his administration, it is curious to note
that naval expansion was not actively pursued in the U.S. at
this time. The U.S. had fought an economic war against the
British since the Chesapeake/Leopard Affair of June 22,
1807. As the War of 1812 approached the gunboat program
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began to lose its momentum with its largest supporter no
longer in office. By 1811 the only vessels under
construction were those gunboats that had been ordered at an
earlier date but were not yet completed. Many of the once
proud ships in ordinary had been allowed to rot and most
still in service were in need of extensive refit and repair.
The navy yards that were maintained had become little more
than storage facilities for rotting naval stores. For a
nation whose economic policy had been designed to be
defensive and based upon regulatory measures to combat the
largest naval force in the world, the lack of preparation of
naval arms was not surprising.128
The only active vessels at sea in 1812 were the sloop
of war Wasp and the small brigs Enterprise, Vixen, Syren,
and Viper. In New York a fully-manned and ready squadron
comprised of the President, United States, Congress, Hornet,
and Argus was waiting. America had seventeen seaworthy
ships: nine frigates and eight smaller vessels. This is in
contrast to the 1,048 in the Royal Navy of which one hundred
twenty were ships-of-the-line and one hundred sixteen were
frigates.129 In the war plans developed, the navy was not to
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put to sea. It was to be totally a land campaign against
Canada from which Great Britain was procuring the majority
of raw supplies needed to support her navy.130 However, the
disarray of the army and the time required to organize and
train the militia allowed the navy enough time to prepare a
few vessels for war.
The best strategy to employ the forces was debated.
Some argued for large squadrons patrolling the seas in
force, while others argued for lone cruisers acting
independently in search of British ships. Between June 21
and August 29, the New York squadron under the command of
Commodore John Rodgers patrolled for British shipping in the
North Atlantic with little result. After this attempt it was
decided to abandon the strategy of squadron operations in
favor of single cruises or occasionally in groups of two or
three.131
For the fist year of the war, American victories at sea
were impressive. Practically all of the ship-on-ship duals
fought between the American vessels and British ended in
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American victories, in particular were three frigate-tofrigate engagements. This was due in large part to the needs
of the British navy to keep close to home for defense
against Napoleon or kept at sea protecting more vital
commerce in its far-flung empire. When the Royal navy began
to seriously invest in the American conflict, the heyday of
the American Navy quickly came to a close. Much of the navy
became bottled up in port unable to leave. Only a few
vessels were actively engaging the British at sea after
1813. The most notable of these was the pacific cruise of
USS Essex.
She escaped into the Pacific and single handedly
destroyed the British whaling industry there. The economic
injury inflicted upon the British trade throughout the first
ten months of the war quickly dwindled as well. Once the
British navy became organized and redistributed its forces
to the American conflict, the American navy proved
ineffectual at best.132
Beginning in 1813 the blockade of the American
coastline became more organized and effective. The Royal
Navy began to raid along the coast in an attempt to further
disrupt American commerce and trade. This type of warfare
was exactly what the gunboats were designed to defend
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against. When confronted with the large men-of-war that
accompanied the British forces, the small craft were forced
to retire to escape destruction.133
The War of 1812 resulted in a rude awakening for
American political thinkers regarding national defense and a
navy. First, the organized British convoy system that
developed after 1812 put and end to the belief that cruiser
and privateers alone could inflict enough commercial damage
to prevent an effective naval operation of an enemy. Second,
the reliance upon a defensive-based maritime strategy was
inadequate to protect American interests. The war
demonstrated the inadequacy of gunboats to prevent attacks
on the American coast. At the same time, reliance upon these
craft took away resources and attention from construction of
vessels that may have been able to put to sea and prevent a
British blockade. The blockade paralyzed the American
economy and the American military machine. Had enough small
ocean going vessels been available to harass merchant
shipping and thereby force more British warships into convoy
duty, then possibly the U.S. could have adopted a naval
building campaign that could have produced ships of
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significant size and number to counter the available British
forces dispatched to contend with them.

97

CHAPTER 5
THE MYTH OF COASTAL FORTIFICATIONS

The second leg of armed maritime defense is embodied in
coastal and harbor emplacements. Since the inception of the
Untied States Government, the threat of a hostile invasion
by foreign powers was at the forefront of military concerns.
From the beginning of the use of gunpowder, artillery, and
cannon, few military principles were as monolithic as
superiority of guns ashore over that of guns afloat. The
reliance upon wind for propulsion in the large warships of
the period severely limited maneuverability, placing them at
a great disadvantage when engaging fortified stationary
shore positions. This principle was adopted whole-heartedly
Thomas Jefferson as the most logical and economical defense
option. It became widely accepted that a system of defensive
fortifications at each of the important harbors would be the
cheapest and most pragmatic way to defend the new nation and
her commerce from overseas threats.134
The persistent fascination with coastal fortifications
stems from many factors. First was the financial status of
the fledgling American nation. The mythos of the American
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anti-military sentiment is rooted in pragmatic issues as
well as idealism. Many of the founding fathers did fear the
threat of a professional military force because it was
through military force that strong centralized governments
in Europe had been able to maintain control over their
populous. A more practical explanation was the financial
requirements of a military force in the emerging national
economy. As idealistically perfect as a citizen army may
sound to some, its significantly reduced price tag was
appealing to even more.
It was under this opinion that Jefferson and the
Republicans worked in opposition to a navy. As expensive as
an army is to maintain, a navy is a much greater drain on
resources. The Naval Act of 1794 proposed navy of four ships
of 44-guns each and two ships of 36-guns each, but by April
30, 1798, only three of the frigates were completed at the
extravagant cost $305,420.135 Armies are much easier to
maintain because they can more easily support themselves off
the land and require less pay. They are easy to disband and
reform as threat requires, so that during peacetime
budgetary expenditures can be greatly reduced. According to
the militia mentality, a very cheap and small professional
army could be maintained that in the event of invasion could
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work in conjuncture with the militia and act as a delaying
force until a temporary army could be raised to force out
the invaders. This theory relied very heavily on the vast
distance between the U.S. and European belligerents as a
deterrence and time saving weapon in the grand American
defense policy.
A navy on the other hand required large expenditures of
money even during peacetime. Crews had to be continuously
maintained and trained to keep themselves and their ships in
fighting trim. Ships themselves were a terrible economical
burden to maintain because they were so susceptible to the
harsh corrosive environment of the sea. Also, the possession
of a small conventional land force is much less threatening
to an overseas empire than a force projecting naval arm.
Jefferson hoped that by maintaining no more of a militant
maritime force than required for defense, i.e. coastal
fortifications and a shallow water gunboat fleet, that no
military threat could be accidentally perceived.136 This it
was hoped would eliminate one more reason for a European
belligerent to open hostilities against the US.

135

Paulin, p 97
Special Message on Gun-Boats, February 10, 1807, To the Senate and
House of Represenatives of the United States. Collection of writings by
Thomas Jefferson. Published by Literary Classics of the United States,
Inc. in New York, 1984. p 539-542.
136

100

The policy of American fortification construction and
design will be analyzed in this paper at a greater length
than the Navy simply because this facet of Jefferson's
defense policy was embraced for a longer time than was his
naval policy. Whereas the in-depth study of the navy ended
with the War of 1812, the issue of fortification will be
carried out through the Civil War. It was this conflict that
proved to be the death null of the Jeffersonian notion of
coastal defense.
Background
The general rule in colonial America was defensive
works were small, primitive, irregularly garrisoned open
earthen works mounting a few small cannon. These
generalizations held true for defenses on the interior
frontier as well as the seaward facing forts. The
imperialist European powers saw no need to construct large
permanent fortifications in frontier territories because
their primary goal was to protect colonists from attacks of
Indians. The only times large permanent fortifications were
constructed along the same lines and quality as those found
in Europe was when they were to protect areas from attacks
by other European colonies that had the skill and ability to
wage a European style war or siege. The notable examples of
this rule were Castle Williams constructed in Boston harbor
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and the formidable Castillo de San Marcos constructed by the
Spanish in St. Augustine, Florida.137
Castle William was named for William III of England. It
was a massive structure constructed of brick cemented with a
mortar made from burnt oyster shells. Originally began in
1689 with funds from England, it was modernized in 1740 and
twenty 42-pound guns were installed on its walls. Its
construction coupled with its armament of over a hundred
guns easily made it the most powerful defensive structure in
the English colonies. Its location was strategic in that its
field of fire controlled the vital harbor at Boston. Castle
Williams was captured by Americans in 1776 and occupied
until its destruction in 1801 to make way for the
construction of the new Fort Independence on the same island
in Boston harbor.138
The Castillo de San Marcos is the oldest standing
permanent European fortification in the United States. It
stands today on the spot where several wooden forts had
previously been erected. The location was chosen because of
the natural harbor adequate for ships of the time and its
proximity to the French Huguenots’ establishment at Ft.
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Caroline, in what is now Jacksonville, Florida.139 It was
Spanish policy that all land in the new world was property
of Spain given to her by Papal decree. This encroachment by
French Protestants was intolerable and demanded military
action to remove them from sovereign Spanish soil, hence the
origin of fortifications in St. Augustine.140
The fort as seen today is a masterpiece of 17th century
defensive works. It is constructed of a material known as
coquina, which is shell rock quarried from nearby Anastasia
Island. The unique consistency of this substance and its
elasticity proved very resilient to solid shot fired from
ships. The British discovered this in 1702 when an
expedition from Charles Towne failed to breech the walls of
the fort after a lengthy siege.141
Both forts epitomized the linear progression of
European fortress design. Fortifications like the Castillo
de San Marcos are the by-products of middle ages' castle
design and the lessons learned from the effect of siege
weapons on the high walls of castles. Fortresses inshore
were at the mercy of siege weapons. These pieces were very
139
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large and could be brought into close range of a fortress's
walls. With enough proximity, even the inaccurate smoothbore
cannon of the time could accurately target the same spot on
the walls of a castle to affect a breech. For this reason
fortress design began to change by lowering walls and
placement of them behind earthen mounds to protect against
direct fire.142 The necessity of keeping the walls of
fortifications low limited the amount of firepower the
fortress could bring to bear on any one target. The guns of
a fortress now could only be mounted on the top of the
exterior walls. Therefore, the number of guns was limited on
any side by the fact that they had to be placed side by side
on a single level of fire. The only way to increase this
number was to extend the length of the walls, but even this
had its limitation. As the walls grew longer, the angle of
fire required for the gun to traverse for targeting
increased to the point that not all of the guns could be
brought to bear. This in addition to the required cost and
engineering difficulty of constructing longer walls of
defense meant that for the foreseeable future defensive
works would remain relatively small.
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Armament of the time also had severe drawbacks for
defensive works. During the colonial era cannon were
generally of small size. By far the majority of artillery
pieces in the colonies were of light size, generally 24pounders or smaller. A few larger pieces could be found in
places like Castle William and the Castillo de San Marcos,
but they were never larger than a 42-pounder.143 The size and
range of artillery over the next century would require a
great number of fortified locations and guns to adequately
defend a strategic location.
Fortifications in the colonial era were mostly
temporary earthen structures designed to be manned for short
duration to respond to specific threats. The two notable
examples that were permanent and well defensible were
quickly allowed to fall into disrepair as the politics of
Europe began to change and economic and military interests
were directed more toward Europe itself. The armament and
technology needed to improve the overall effectiveness of
harbor fortifications would be increased greatly as a result
of Jeffersonian ideals but not before a period of
experimentation and national maturing would take place.
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In the early 19th century the U.S. managed to fortify
thirty-five separate coastal locations from Canada to
Georgia. By 1850 that number had decreased to twenty, by
1900 it was down to sixteen, and by 1940 there were only ten
permanent fortifications on the American Eastern seaboard
between Maine and Savannah, Georgia.144 The decline in the
number of coastal defenses in the late 19th and 20th
centuries was as a result of fewer, yet more powerful guns
that could cover a wider area with more accuracy. By 1900,
only one heavy gun was needed roughly for every five
emplaced in 1865.145 Also, the number of vital harbors
diminished. As ships got larger, the number of ports in use
for major maritime traffic declined because they were no
longer adequate. The diminishing number of guns needed to
defend a given area and the fewer number of vital strategic
navigable waterways account for the decline of harbor
defenses.
Construction Programs
The fortification policy of the early Republic took
shape in three basic forms as determined by the construction
method and design characteristics of the fortifications.
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Although there were three distinct building programs, many
projects overlapped and many were completed during later
construction periods. The first two construction periods
were direct results of threats upon the U.S. by European
powers. As such they were more hastily constructed with less
planning and effort placed into their construction. So long
as hostility was not perceived to be imminent, defensive and
military concerns were not at the forefront of political
concerns. The result was a limited appreciation for the
future repercussions of a decaying military force for the
immediate and shortsighted needs of the economy.

Peacetime

military expenditures and mentality were ill prepared to
cope with the larger concern of long-term economic and
national security. This trend of disregarding the military
in peacetime for short-term economic improvement was, and
is, typical.
The first construction period lasted from 1794 to 1807.
It was divided into three different periods. The first
occurred in 1794 as the threat of open European interference
with American commerce increased. The second phase occurred
in 1798 with the Quasi-War with France, and the third
occurred in 1801 as a result of a resurgence of British
antagonism on the high seas.
145
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In 1807 the second fortification policy was drafted as
a result of increased tension between the U.S. and Great
Britain and in particular the Chesapeake incident of June
1807.146 Few examples remain of these first two periods
because the materials of which they were constructed. Many
were constructed on good ground and were later destroyed to
make way for newer defensive works. The third and final
coastal defense policy that will be studied in this research
was begun in 1817 and was unique in that it was the lone
example that was undertaken under relatively peaceful
circumstances with no imminent threat apparent.
The political climate in Europe deteriorated rapidly
after the conclusion of the American Revolution. Most
notably on July 14, 1789, the French Revolution began that
that had unprecedented repercussions throughout Europe and
the world.147 For purposes of consideration here, the
relative turmoil in Europe in the 1790s prompted the House
of Representatives in 1794 to convene a special committee to
address the issue of locations and defensives that should be
erected to provide for a defense of the U.S. On February 28,
1794, the committee report on the expense required to place
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the principle seaports and harbors of the United States was
read by Mr. Thomas Fitzsimons a Represenative from
Pennsylvania in the House of Representatives.148 It was
estimated that it would cost $76,053.25 to erect the
defensive works and another $96,645 to cast and construct
the cannon and carriages needed to arm the forts. This
included a list of the recommended defended seaports which
were listed as follows: Portland, Maine; Portsmouth, New
Hampshire; Cape Ann, Salem, Marblehead, and Boston all in
Massachusetts; Newport Rhode, Island; New London,
Connecticut; New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk,
Wilmington, North Carolina; Ocracock Inlet; Charleston,
South Carolina; and Savannah, Georgia.149 Within three weeks,
on March 20, 1794, the first Federal authorization was
passed for the construction of defenses on the U.S. coast.150
Due to the haste and need for the defenses, the
Secretary of War issued only general design characteristics
for the forts. For the most part, specific plans and
logistics were handled by the local engineer. This trend of
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leaving the majority of control and leadership of fort
construction to the local state and municipality would be
visible in the lack of defensive and architectural
consistency in the individual forts. The result was little
more than the rehashing of colonial era wilderness
fortification. Most forts of the first series were open
works with earthen parapets. Depending on the size and
importance of the harbor, some defenses were armed with
eight to ten guns up to several dozen. The bulk of armament
lay on the vital seaward side, with only a few light cannon
protecting the landward approaches, supplemented by a few
defensives redoubts or blockhouses. With only a few
exceptions, most were constructed simply of loose earth and
covered with grass to prevent erosion. In areas where the
soil lacked the cohesion necessary to support itself, timber
and occasionally stone facing was used to front the walls.
French engineers drew up the design of most of the
early forts. However, given that the land where they were
constructed belonged to the individual states, all design
proposals had to be approved by the local governors. The
influence of these individuals and their subordinates led to
many alterations from the original plans created. In
addition to this, funds were sporadic and amounts varied
from year to year.
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With the deterioration of relations with France the
government decided to allocate more funds in 1798, $300,000
was allocated for defensive protection of the frontiers and
$292,678 was allocated for maintenance and preservation of
the Army.151 What works had been originally completed in the
1794 program had quickly succumbed to the elements and were
in dire need of repair. Of the first permanent fortification
built under the United States Government, only two survive
in a relatively unaltered state, these are Ft. Mifflin near
Philadelphia and Ft. McHenry in Baltimore. Ft. Mifflin
demonstrates the lack of cohesive design construction in
that it features a star shaped wall system and incorporated
into this a modified bastion design.152 In contrast to this,
Ft. McHenry is a typical pentagonal shaped walled structure
with an overly prominent bastion located at each of the
points.153 The large bastions are characteristics of earlier
single-tiered fortresses and would later be replaced with
smaller multi-leveled bastions demonstrated in the second
and largely third series of American defensive works.154
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Between 1800 and 1807, the issue of coastal defenses
once again fell to the wayside of public concern and
sentiment. Compounding this issue was the economic policy of
the new President, Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson’s economic
policy was focused on eliminating the national debt and
decreasing national expenditures.155 During this time, no
appreciable amount was allocated for the maintenance of
existing structures or the construction of new ones. It was
not until the Chesapeake incident on June 22, 1807, that
Jefferson became significantly concerned with national
defense to alter his opinion on funding for national
defense.156 On July 2, President Jefferson proclaimed that
all armed vessels of His Majesty’s Navy “now within in the
harbors or waters of the United States, immediately and
without delay to depart from the same.”157 Harbors were
sealed off to British warships in American waters and those
already in port could not receive servicing. The main
irritation occurred around the lower Chesapeake Bay and the
harbor at Norfolk, Virginia and Hampton Roads.
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The result of this event and the turning of Jefferson’s
military agenda was the appropriation of over three million
dollars for coastal defense for the next several years. This
was by far the largest amount yet made available for defense
construction. The program went into application rather
quickly and between 1807 and 1812 a number of significant
works were constructed in time for the War of 1812. The
works of what would become known as the Second system were
as a general rule more elaborate than those of the First
System yet still lacked coordinated design and planning.
Still present was a high degree of variation and local
influence on design characteristics. Despite this continuing
problem, it is significant to note that unlike the preceding
design series that was designed by French military planners,
the Second system was designed by led by engineers of
American birth and training.158
Whereas the first system was limited by funds to open
earthen parapets, the second system was more varied given
additional capital. Works in the second system were
comprised of three general types: open batteries, masonry
faced earthen forts, and most importantly all masonry
158
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forts.159 The open batteries constructed in the second system
were basically the same as those in the first with the
exception that they were used primarily as supporting works
for more significant defenses constructed using more
formidable construction methods.
The masonry faced earthen forts were the more numerous
of the Second system style. They resemble the last of the
First system defenses constructed. These structures are subcategorized into two architectural styles. The more common
made extensive use of circular and elliptical lines in the
construction of the external walls. Many of these forts had
a regular pentagonal shaped system of exterior walls with
circular shaped bastions utilized for defense. Few examples
of these exist in their original state. Like most other
forts of the first and second systems, they fell victim to
major alterations or replacement by more significant works
in the third system. The best surviving example of this
style is Ft. Norfolk in Virginia, which was completed in
1809.160 Its main armament was housed in a semi-elliptical
battery and was constructed to replace a work constructed in
the 1794 program.
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The other unique design style of the second system
masonry faced earthen forts was a star shape. Many of these
were updated first system works, which had there masonry
fronts added later. Many of these were constructed with
bastions, which were to provide overlapping arcs of fire to
protect the exterior walls. A few were constructed without
bastions relying on the angles created by the star shape to
provide the same type of protective capability. The best
example of this is Ft. Wood on Bedloe’s Island in New York
harbor. This unique eleven-pointed specimen now serves as
the base for the Statue of Liberty.161
By far the most significant and far reaching influence
of the second system was the all-masonry fort. These
structures would go on to influence fortification design and
construction for the next fifty years. Most influential in
this design was the casemated gun emplacements possible with
high walled stone fortifications. As explained earlier, the
length of the walls limited the amount of firepower
deliverable because cannon could only be mounted on one
level. The new design using arches and multiple levels could
facilitate several levels of cannon, effectively increasing
firepower exponentially while at the same time decreasing
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the overall perimeter area covered by defensive walls. This
also enabled defenders in a fort to stay behind a more
secure series of defensives, protecting them from enemy
fire. The multiple tiers of cannon placement effectively
stacked the firepower of a fort in a manner similar to that
of warships of the time.162
Construction of forts in this manner had since the
inception of gunpowder been a taboo. High walled castles of
the Middle Ages proved very ineffective against large siege
artillery. Their masonry walls proved susceptible to
artillery fire for two reasons. First was the consistency of
stonewalls. When shot impacted the walls, the lack of
elasticity in stone resulted in large amounts of damage when
struck at high velocity. With consistent accuracy and fire,
walls could easily be breeched with successive hits. Second,
the by-product of these impacts was the eruption of vast
amounts shrapnel provided by the material of the walls. This
factor proved deadly to men inside the fort where little
refuge could be found when the hail of small missiles
erupted forth from the wall after being impacted by cannon
fire. For this reason, European designers began to lower the
walls of their defenses and place them behind mounds of
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earth. Earth was elastic enough to absorb the impact of the
hit with no appreciable damage. In conjunction with this,
these earthen defensive works were moved further away from
the walls of the fort to deny the artillery the necessary
proximity to exhibit direct fire on the walls to ensue a
breech.163
So why is it that the Americans suddenly decided to
abandon this accepted rule of strategic design? The answer
is quite simple: the rules that applied to European
fortresses were customized to defensive works on land
protecting strategic land routes and population centers. The
American emphasis was on seaward defense, not landward. The
threat of siege artillery was not as great because ships as
gun platforms were not accurate enough and could not get
close enough to effect a typical artillery siege barrage.
Time and improvements in rifled artillery would prove to be
the death knell of this concept, but at the beginning of its
theoretical development, the reliance on relatively small
smoothbore cannon made its success a very real
possibility.164
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It was under these conditions that the greatest
peacetime U. S. defensive construction program of the 19th
century was begun. This largest of programs was begun in a
time of peace in 1817, when no threat, foreign or domestic,
was perceived by the U.S. This is a unique circumstance in
itself in that all previous military expenditures were as a
result of a direct military threat. The fact that expediency
was not required in this circumstance allowed emphasis to be
placed on the creation of a truly permanent and integrated
system of harbor defenses. Individual engineers who had
worked independently of one another with very vague
guidelines provided by the Secretary of War constructed the
works of the first two systems. For the third system, a
board was appointed to coordinate and supervise construction
of all works in the new system and to ensure their
characteristics and effectiveness. The board was organized
in late 1816 and was placed under the control of Simon
Bernard, a former brigadier general under Napoleon.165 Upon
being recommended by Lafayette he came to the United States
where he was given a commission of the same grade. The
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original purpose of the board was to evaluate not only
defensive works but also interior lines of communications
and transportation and all other aspects associated with a
unified defensive plan.166
A key aspect of this was the navy. It is at this
juncture that I will iterate in brief the gunboat navy
developed in the early 1800s by the Jefferson
administration. A southern and western administration with
little direct ties in a maritime system, they were not at
all motivated to put forth the funds needed for a large
offensive blue-water navy. Instead the administration set
itself upon a naval policy focusing on a strictly defensive
coastal fleet comprised of small gunboats. The President
sold this notion to the Congress by citing examples that all
nations used a similar fleet of vessels and the Barbary
pirates of North Africa had made particularly good use of
them in combat. So beginning in 1805, instead of
constructing larger warships of the line, like 74-gun ships,
the Congress funded the construction of twenty-five small
fifty to seventy-five foot single and double gunned boats
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for harbor defense.167 This action was repeated over the next
successive years, but given the unexpected rapid rate at
which these small vessels decayed varying amounts had to
constructed every year in order to reach the recommended 257
needed for an “adequate” defense. By 1807, when the program
was seriously cut back, there were over 176 in service.168
These small gunboats were to be used in conjuncture with
defensive works to create a unified umbrella of defense for
American harbors.
The Bernard Board explained the necessity of
maintaining a significant and capable naval arm in order to
accurately defend the American coast. In its first report
issued in 1821, the board voiced what was an early form
naval strategy that would later be adopted and printed by
Alfred Thayer Mahan. Essentially, the board began to
evaluate what harbors and anchorages would be necessary to
provide effective bases of operations for naval forces, and
as a secondary thought planned the defensive works needed to
defend these strategic ports. This view essentially voiced
the notion that although defensive in a tactical sense,
fortifications served an offensive role in the strategic
sense. Forts defended principle ports from invasion in a
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tactical sense but in the strategic sense the defense and
preservation of one’s base of supplies and maintenance acts
in an offensive role, by protecting one’s ability to fight
and wage war.
Ironically the notion that these structures should be
manned intermittently at best in times of peace and even
then by local state troops would prove to be terrific
blunder in the ensuing Civil War. It was because of this
tradition that so many of Federal defenses fell into the
hands of the Confederacy. With little or no federal
garrisons to man them, when states seceded, state troops
simply marched in a commandeered them with little or no
resistance.169
In this report, the board barely made mention of the
first and second defensive systems at all. What few were not
destroyed for the construction of newer defenses were
updated and integrated into larger scaled defense plans.
Most works of the new system were straightforward and linear
in their construction. Some of the most spectacular
defensive works in history stem from this construction
169
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period. Sumter, Pulaski, Monroe, Pickens, and Jackson are
just few of notoriety.
This period of construction also resulted in some of
the largest defenses ever constructed. Ft. Monroe in
Virginia was designed to command the approaches to Hampton
Roads and was the first work of the third system designed
from the ground up.170 It was believed for many years to be
the largest defensive work constructed that did not enclose
a civilian population. The largest constructed at the time
in regards to firepower was the formidable Ft. Jefferson
constructed on Garden Key in the Dry Tortugas seventy miles
west of Key West. It was constructed on a small atoll and
cost over a dollar a brick just to have construction
material shipped to the site for construction. Although
never fully armed, it was designed to house over 450 guns
and control the vital entrance to the Gulf of Mexico.171
Many of these forts would be constructed to house two
or three tiers of cannon, most of which concentrated on the
seaward side. Given that the bulk of fire would come from
concealment behind walls, designers had to incorporate
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design innovations that would allow the movement of cannon
behind the walls to track a moving target while at the same
time provide for the smallest opening possible to protect
gun crews from small arms fire. The result was that by the
1820s, gun tracking was maximized to 60° of horizontal
movement. In return angles of intersection on exterior walls
had to be of at least 120° in order to prevent blind spots
form forming on the walls.172 This geometric standard laid
the groundwork for the construction of forts of this era to
follow a similar style of hexagonal shape. Defenses such as
these constructed in areas of relative natural defense from
land assault i.e. marshes, salt lands, etc. were usually
devoid of defensives bastions. Many also had their landward
facing side truncated, as can be seen in the design
characteristics of Ft. Sumter in South Carolina and Ft.
Pulaski in Georgia.173 Most of these forts were also
constructed only a few feet above the water so as to deny
approaching vessels the ability to sneak under their guns
and also to aid gunners in “skipping” their cannonballs
across the water to exact damage on an enemy ship. The forts
being constructed of durable brick could be built this close
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to the hostile environment of the sea with little concern
for its corrosive nature.
Armament
The downfall of this magnificent era of coastal defense
architecture would be the rifled cannon. Whereas the
military engineers in Europe learned of the devastation
caused by direct fire from close smooth bore cannon, so to
would American defenders learn the same results from long
distance rifled cannon. Rifled cannon were able to fire
their elongated projectile a much greater distance at high
velocity and with more accuracy than had been imagined just
a few years before. This quantum leap in coastal armament
rehashed the weakness of high-walled defenses again and made
them obsolete.
A textbook example of this comes from the fall of Ft.
Pulaski in Savannah, Georgia. In March 1862 it became the
first victim of long range rifled artillery of the American
Civil War. Using ten rifles and twenty-six smoothbores,
Union troops were able to breech the 7.5-foot thick walls in
a little more than twenty-four hours. What is of
significance to note is that the Union batteries were over a
mile away, a feet rarely accomplished before.174
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Much of the artillery available to defend U.S. harbors
in the first and second system of forts were leftover
European pieces from the colonial period. The size of these
cannon was measured in the weight of the shot they fired.
The largest in service around the time of the first system
would have been a few 32-pounder and 42-pounder guns. Their
weights and quality varied given their age and some were
still cast from bronze. In 1794 the bill passed providing
funding for the fortifications also provided for the
founding of newer artillery.175 These guns were all
smoothbore firing round shot and had a relative range of
under two thousand yards with a five degree elevation
offered by the carriages they were mounted on. By the Second
series of construction a few 50-pounder guns were being cast
and placed in key defensive works. New pieces of artillery
called Columbaids were developed around 1810 and could fire
exploding shells as well as solid shot.176 Exploding shells
were normally reserved for smaller cannon or high angle
weapons like mortars and howitzers. They were also capable
of firing at almost any degree of inclination, not limited
to five degrees of early cannon style. This effectively
175
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tripled the range of coastal artillery. These guns were
revolutionary and were one of the first major American
contributions to the world of artillery.
Cannon size remained relatively the same until the
1820s when cannon design began to change dramatically. The
Bernard Board had originally called for cannon no larger the
24-pounders, but this notion was soon discarded. Studies in
metallurgy and ballistics soon paved the way for
advancements in artillery. Smoothbore technology reached its
zenith in the 1840s with creations by Thomas Rodman and John
Dahlgren.177 By studying the design characteristics of cannon
and how gasses expanded in the chamber when exploded, they
were able to reinvent that art of cannon casting.
The most notable factor was the appearance of the new
cannons. They were rather bulbous in the rear, smooth on the
exterior, and tapered to the muzzle. This style was a
reflection of the expansion characteristics of gas in the
gun when fired. By following these lines and making the
cannon take the shape of the explosion, the gasses could
travel more freely with less pressure, thereby decreasing
the chance of explosion. Another major change was the way in
which the guns were cooled after forging. Standard practice
176
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was to cool the outside of the gun first; this caused the
breech to be of weaker construction than the outside wall.
Rodman discovered that by cooling the inside of the barrel
first, it became less stressed during the process, and the
cooling of the bore first followed by the exterior served to
compress and reinforce the structural integrity of the bore
making it more resilient to pressure and stress.178
The result of these design changes were cannons much
larger and safer than had ever been constructed. Rodman’s
15-inch gun became the standard for seacoast defense
artillery. It was easily the most powerful service cannon in
the world at the time. Many remained in service from the
Civil War up to the 1900s. It was after the adoption of
these weapons that artillery became more commonly referred
to in the inch size of the projectile they fired instead of
the weight of their shot. As an example a 10-inch Rodman
cannon fired a one hundred twenty-five pound shot and a 15inch could fire a four hundred thirty-four pound shot.179
It was the production and use of rifled artillery that
closed the chapter on the magnificent masonry forts. Most
common of these were of the design by Robert Parrott. His
cast iron guns were produced in numbers exceeding one
177
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thousand seven hundred during the Civil War.180 They were
found in many weights from 10 to 300-pounders. While the
chamber pressures associated with both smoothbores and
rifles were comparable, the elongated and aerodynamic shape
of the rifles projectile ensured a much longer and flatter
trajectory. The effective range of a 20-pound Parrott rifle
was 4,400 yards at a 15° elevation, while a mammoth 100pounder was effective to a distance of 7,180 yards with a 25°
elevation.181 These weapons and the type of projectiles they
fired were able to accomplish quickly and easily what it had
traditionally taken a long and tedious bombardment of
smoothbore cannon to do. What was demonstrated very clearly
is that if man can overcome natural barriers such as oceans
and mountains, then stagnant defenses created by man himself
will surely fall when left to defend themselves.
As significant as the development of these weapons were
for the defenders of the forts, what is paramount in this
research is what became instrumental in the destruction of
the myth of reliance on fortifications as the defenders of
American soil. Maritime strategy is the collective
collaboration between three crucial elements:
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1. An effective force projecting blue-water fleet that
while acting in a offensive role tactically is in
actuality a defensive arm strategically in that its
actions are in defense of its home base and its state’s
political and economic interests abroad.
2. A series of defendable harbors and ports that can
adequately supply and maintain the naval arm of the
defense while at the same time aid in the deterrence of
allowing an enemy the use of the same harbors for his
own means. In this aspect the defenses of harbors serve
as an offensive strategic weapon because they provide
the means for the way in which the war is fought and
won.
3. An acceptable infrastructure and interior lines of
communications that can provide logistical support
efficiently when needed and have easily defended
strategic centers, which are supplemented by a mobile
and effective response force.
With the reliance on isolated defensive posts and no
buffering force projecting fleet, the maritime strategy
centered on defensive works alone was doomed to fail. The
advent of newer and more effective artillery simply
reinforced this accepted fact. As time would show the U.S.
did adjust its strategy in the late 19th century, almost to
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the opposite extreme. The state of U.S. coastal defense
during the Spanish American War could have had disastrous
results had not the American Navy had such a vast naval
superiority over the Spanish. Surely the stereotypical
conservative mind of the military leadership feared
moderation in that day as well as it always has. The net
result was that the Jeffersonian notion of relying strictly
on a defensive military capability for protection and a
policy of using American commerce and trade as a weapon of
policy control over Europe was flawed and ineffective at
protecting American commercial interests. As was clearly
demonstrated, balance and moderation in military capability
was then, and is today, necessary in an effective defense
policy.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The early maritime history of the United States is a
unique paradox of extensive commercial efficiency and
military ineptness. This research has illustrated the
complexity of politics, economics, and the military in the
early years of the republic. The maritime defense policy of
the Jeffersonian persuasion failed but in an unexpected way.
His ideals for defense succeeded militarily but failed
politically.
As events proved, the Jeffersonian maritime initiative
failed to provide protection to American maritime commercial
interests. This assessment is based upon the Mahan’s
philosophy that the primary purpose of a navy and maritime
defense is the protection of commerce upon the sea. In a
view of war, more in line with Clausewitz’s interpretation,
Jefferson’s maritime strategy did not fail. If Clausewitz is
correct that war is the ultimate expression of will on
another, and military forces, including naval, are the means
by which arms are delivered, then the American navy proved
reluctantly adequate in resisting armed aggression. The
proof of this is echoed by the fact that America was not
assimilated back into the British Empire, nor was she
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controlled by any other nation. Jefferson’s tactics and
strategies may not have achieved many tactical victories,
but strategic victory is often achieved through apparent
tactical defeats.
My argument is analogous to Washington’s strategy
during the American Revolution. Time after time he was
defeated on the battlefield by the British. Given the
accepted principles of warfare at the time, his repeated
loss of the battlefield meant defeat. Pragmatically,
however, so long as his army was defeated, not destroyed, he
was still victorious. Neither Washington, nor anyone else
would argue that this would have been the ideal way to wage
the war and win, but it did prove successful. Washington was
forced to think outside of the box in order to best use his
limited army in a manner that would preserve it. If the
ultimate goal of war is to disarm an enemy, the failure to
do so and achieve total control negates any tactical
victory.
As explained in this research, Jeffersonian maritime
defense relied upon two principles, the use of economic
coercion as an offensive weapon and the use of the navy and
harbor defenses in a strictly defensive nature. The
motivating force behind these two principles was the
elimination of the national debt and reduced federal
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spending. Between 1801 and 1812, the Republicans reduced the
national debt by $38 million, or about 40%.182 It has been
clearly expressed how most of Jefferson’s military ideas
conflicted with accepted strategic doctrine. There is no
doubt that had proper funds and support been directed toward
the navy early in the republic, events would have unfolded
very differently. It is unlikely given the population and
industry available, that America could have constructed a
fleet to rival Great Britain or France in standard naval
combat. However, it might have been possible for the nation
to develop a sizeable enough force to prove decisive in an
active defense given factors such as distance an enemy fleet
must travel from its bases to attack the U.S. coast, etc.
With this being said, the Jeffersonian defense oriented
maritime strategy succeeded in preventing our assimilation
by another national entity. The reason it succeeded was
because it had elements of compromise from Federalist naval
proponents at its disposal. Federalist spending was kept
under control so as not to cause the new American debt to
grow to rapidly; which could have caused a great deal of
internal strife and resentment leading to factionalization
and political and civic turmoil. Heavy taxation to
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compensate for an accelerated debt could have led to another
revolution in such a young republic.
The Federalists super-frigates constructed were
essential in helping deter enemy aggression and forcing
aggressor nations into investing so much cost and effort as
to limit their window of operations. Because of their
constant warfare, distance from the U.S., and the presence
of a small yet effective military force, France and England
simply could not divert the time and resources needed to
effectively campaign against the American establishment long
enough to win.
This moderation between Jeffersonian thrift and
Federalist spending produced a sufficient enough force,
albeit not ideal, to preserve American independence. But, it
would not preserve Jefferson’s political dreams for the
country. Under the onslaught of industrial and commercial
interests, Jefferson’s defensive agenda proved too costly
not for American independence but for American commerce. The
economic damage done by his Non-Importation Act, embargos,
and the inability of the defensive American Navy to break
the British blockade of 1812 proved too much for the
political motivated wealthy elite. After 1812, the Federal
government decided not to allow American commerce to be
bottled up again in time of war. A construction program was
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begun to modernize and increase the navy. This was one of
many first steps that led to the increase in the authority
of the Federal government and American maritime force.
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